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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to design algorithms that provide qual-
ity of service and enforce cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks. Using
a simple network model, we first study the performance of some previously
proposed cooperation-enforcing strategies and then present a new mecha-
nism. We prove that our mechanism is robust to imperfect measurements, is
collusion-resistant, and can achieve full cooperation among nodes. Assuming
cooperation is being enforced, we then study the problem of optimal routing
and admission control for flows which require a pre-specified bandwidth from
the network. We develop an algorithm whose performance is close to that of
an omniscient off-line algorithm that has complete a priori knowledge of the
entire sequence of flow arrivals and their bandwidth requests, including the
future. We then study the problem of congestion control and scheduling in
wireless ad hoc networks that have to support a mixture of best-effort and
real-time traffic. We propose a model for incorporating the requirements of
packets with deadlines in an optimization framework. The solution to the
problem results in a joint congestion control and scheduling algorithm which
fairly allocates resources to meet the fairness objectives of both elastic and
inelastic flows, and the per-packet delay requirements of inelastic flows.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Wireless ad hoc networks promise to provide ubiquitous connectivity with-
out the need for any infrastructure. Such networks are expected to support
services that require quality of service (QoS) guarantees, such as voice, video,
and remote sensing. To efficiently provide such services, these networks rely
on the assumption that intermediate nodes are willing to relay packets to
distant destinations when single-hop source-destination communications are
not possible or desirable. In this dissertation we first study how to enforce
cooperation in relay nodes, and assuming cooperation is achieved, we then
design algorithms that can guarantee minimum-bandwidth and maximum
per-packet delay requirements. More specifically, we have studied the follow-
ing problems:
1. A Reputation Mechanism to Incentivize Cooperation in Wireless Ad
Hoc Networks
In wireless ad hoc networks one way to incentivize nodes to forward
other nodes’ packets is through the use of reputation mechanisms,
where cooperation is induced by the threat of partial or total net-
work disconnection if a node acts selfishly. The problem is that packet
collisions and interference may make cooperative nodes appear selfish
sometimes, generating unnecessary and unwanted punishments.
The contributions are the following:
• We use a simple game-theoretic network model to study the ro-
bustness of some previously proposed reputation-based strategies.
We show that some strategies are not self-enforcing, meaning that
there is an incentive to deviate from the expected behavior, while
others punish selfish behavior at the expense of the throughput
of cooperative nodes, potentially leading to complete network dis-
connection due to retaliation.
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• We propose a new strategy called DARWIN (Distributed and
Adaptive Reputation Mechanism for Wireless ad hoc Networks)
that effectively detects and punishes selfish behavior. We derive
conditions under which no node can gain from deviating from our
strategy, prove that full cooperation can emerge among nodes, and
that our scheme is collusion resistant.
• Simulations are presented to complement the theoretical contribu-
tions. Our results show that the throughput achieved with DAR-
WIN is better than any of the other strategies studied, and that
DARWIN can be implemented with low overhead.
2. Admission Control and Routing in Multi-Hop Wireless Networks
We consider the problem of optimal routing and admission control for
flows which require a pre-specified bandwidth from the network. This
problem has been extensively studied for wireline networks, but until
now, there has been no systematic study on the role of load balancing
in obtaining good wireless network performance. We study the problem
using competitive analysis, where a given on-line (causal) algorithm’s
performance is compared against the performance of an off-line algo-
rithm which also has access to future traffic patterns.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We developed a model for admission control and routing with
minimum-bandwidth constraints in multi-hop wireless networks,
which allows us to derive an algorithm with provable performance
guarantees using competitive analysis. Our algorithm makes no
statistical assumptions on the flow arrival pattern or other param-
eters of the arriving requests.
• We showed that no other algorithm performs better in an asymp-
totic sense to be described later. The proof of this result is more
involved than the corresponding result for wireline networks and
relies on the unique characteristics of wireless networks.
• The optimal algorithm is not in a form that is amenable to dis-
tributed implementation. Thus, we converted the algorithm into
a form that allows the use of standard shortest-path algorithms.
2
3. Optimal Scheduling for Fair Resource Allocation in Ad Hoc Networks
with Elastic and Inelastic Traffic
We study the problem of congestion control and scheduling in peer to
peer ad hoc wireless networks that have to support a mixture of best-
effort and real-time traffic. Optimization and stochastic network theory
have been successful in designing architectures for fair resource alloca-
tion to meet long-term throughput demands. However, to the best of
our knowledge, strict per-packet delay deadlines were not considered in
this framework previously.
The main contributions are as follows:
• We present an optimization framework for resource allocation in a
wireless network consisting of both best-effort flows and flows that
generate traffic with per-packet delay constraints. The framework
allows for very general interference, channel and arrival models.
• Using a dual decomposition approach, we derive an optimal sched-
uling and congestion control algorithm that fairly allocates re-
sources and ensures that a required fraction of each inelastic flow’s
packets are delivered on time by appealing to connections between
Lagrange multipliers, queues, and service deficits. The scheduling
algorithm seamlessly integrates inelastic and elastic traffic into a
unified max-weight scheduling framework, extending the classical
results in [1] and the recent results of [2, 3].
• The convergence of the above algorithm in an appropriate stochas-
tic sense is proved and it is also shown that the network is stable.
3
CHAPTER 2
A REPUTATION MECHANISM TO
INCENTIVIZE COOPERATION IN
WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORKS
Wireless ad hoc networks consist of a set of self-configuring nodes that do not
rely on any infrastructure to communicate among each other. To achieve this
goal, a source communicates with a distant destination through intermediate
nodes that act as relays. It is usually assumed that in such networks, nodes
are willing to cooperate by forwarding packets, but this assumption is not
necessarily true in the case where all nodes are not under the control of
a single authority. In these cases, there can be selfish nodes that want to
maximize their own welfare without regard to social welfare, where we define
a node’s welfare as the benefit of its actions minus the cost of its actions. In
such scenarios, cooperation cannot be taken for granted, and it is therefore
necessary to develop mechanisms that allow cooperation to emerge even in
the presence of selfish users.
Incentive mechanisms can be broadly divided in two categories: credit-
exchange systems and reputation-based systems. In credit-exchange sys-
tems [4–10], cooperation is induced by means of payments received every
time a node acts as a relay and forwards a packet, and such credit can later
be used by these nodes to encourage others to cooperate. To guarantee that
nodes do not counterfeit payments, some strategies rely on the use of tamper-
proof hardware to store credit and guarantee the checks and balances, but
this strategy may hinder their ability to find widespread acceptance; other
strategies rely on the presence of an off-line central trusted authority which
may be hard to guarantee in some scenarios. In reputation-based strate-
gies [11–19], a node’s behavior is measured by other nodes in the network.
Selfish behavior is then discouraged by the threat of partial or total network
disconnection. The problem is that due to interference and collisions it is
not always possible to perfectly estimate how a node behaves, so sometimes
cooperative nodes are perceived as being selfish and punished accordingly;
such scenarios can lead to retaliation situations that may potentially decrease
4
the throughput of cooperative nodes.
The contributions of this chapter are twofold: first, we use a simple game-
theoretic network model to study the robustness of some previously pro-
posed reputation-based strategies. We show that some strategies are not
self-enforcing, meaning that there is an incentive to deviate from the ex-
pected behavior, while others punish selfish behavior at the expense of the
throughput of cooperative nodes, potentially leading to complete network
disconnection due to retaliation. Second, we propose a new strategy called
DARWIN (Distributed and Adaptive Reputation Mechanism for Wireless ad
hoc Networks) that effectively detects and punishes selfish behavior. We
derive conditions under which no node can gain from deviating from our
strategy, prove that full cooperation can emerge among nodes, and prove
that our scheme is collusion-resistant.
Simulations are also presented to complement the theoretical contributions.
Our results show that the throughput achieved with DARWIN is better than
any of the other strategies studied, and that DARWIN can be implemented
with low overhead.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 introduces some
concepts from game theory that are used in this chapter. In Section 2.2 we
define the network model which will be used in Section 2.3 to analyze some of
the previously proposed strategies. We introduce our strategy in Section 2.4,
analyze the conditions under which cooperation can emerge, study its perfor-
mance, and show that it is relatively insensitive to parameter choices. The
impact of collusion among nodes is also studied there. Section 2.5 presents
the results of a simulation-based study of DARWIN and how it compares to
other reputation-based strategies. Section 2.6 presents an overview of related
work.
2.1 Basic Game Theory Concepts
Here we introduce the concepts from game theory [20] that are used in this
chapter. As an illustration, we use a well-known game between two players
known as The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Both players have two possible pure
strategies, Cooperate (C) or Defect (D), and the payoffs they receive for their
actions are given in Table 2.1. Then player i’s strategy space Si is defined
5
Table 2.1: Payoff Matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Player 1
Cooperate 1 1 −1 2
Defect 2 − 1 0 0
to be the set of pure strategies available to it. In this case Si = {C,D} for
i = {1, 2}. A strategy profile is defined to be an element of the product-space
of strategy spaces of each player. An example is for player 1 to play D and
player 2 to play C.
Definition 1. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile having the property
that no player can benefit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy. ⋄
Such a strategy profile is considered to be self-enforcing. In this example,
the Nash equilibrium would be the strategy profile s = (D,D). Assume now
that this game is repeated infinitely many times, and for each k, the outcomes
of the k− 1 preceding plays are observed before the kth stage begins. In this
case, the total payoff of the game for player i is the discounted sum of the
stage payoffs. Denoting the stage payoffs by u
(k)
i , the total payoff is given by
Ui =
∞∑
k=0
wku
(k)
i ,
where w ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The infinitely repeated game can
also be interpreted as a repeated game that ends after a random number of
repetitions. Under this interpretation, the length of the game is a geometric
random variable with mean 1/(1− w).
In this game a player’s strategy specifies the action it will take at each
stage, for each possible history of play through previous stages. In our ex-
ample a strategy for player 1 could be to cooperate until player 2 defects,
and then defect forever. Since both players know the previous history, we
can view the game starting at stage k with a given history hk as a new game;
this is called a subgame of the original game.
Definition 2. For a given set of strategies that are in Nash equilibrium, his-
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tory hk is on the equilibrium path if it can be reached with positive probability
if the game is played according to the equilibrium strategies, and is off the
equilibrium path otherwise. ⋄
Definition 3. A Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect if the players’ strate-
gies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. ⋄
Subgame perfection is a stronger concept that eliminates noncredible equi-
libria, since it analyzes the case when a game is on or off the equilibrium
path. This will later help us analyze whether a given reputation scheme is
robust enough to handle the case when, due to inaccurate measurements,
nodes appear to be out of their predicted behavior.
Definition 4. A game is continuous at infinity if for each player i the payoff
Ui satisfies:
sup
h,h˜ s.t. hk=h˜k
∣∣∣Ui(h)− Ui(h˜)∣∣∣→ 0 as k →∞.
⋄
Under this definition, events in the distant future are relatively unimpor-
tant. This holds true if the total payoff of the game is the discounted sum of
the per-period payoffs u
(k)
i , and the per-period payoffs are uniformly bounded.
In our example this holds true since u
(k)
i ≤ 2 for all k.
Lemma 1 (One-Stage Deviation Principle). In an infinite-horizon multi-
stage game with observed actions that is continuous at infinity, strategy profile
s is subgame perfect if and only if there is no player i and strategy sˆi that
agrees with si except at a single stage k and h
k, and such that sˆi gives a better
payoff than si conditional on history h
k being reached. ⋄
For a proof see [20]. We say that s satisfies the One-Stage Deviation
Principle if no player can gain by deviating from s, either on or off the
equilibrium path, in a single stage.
In the rest of this chapter we will develop a prisoner’s dilemma model
for wireless networks. Such an exercise has been carried out before in other
papers, but our approach and solution are quite different.
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Table 2.2: Payoff Matrix of the Packet Forwarding Game
Node 2
Forward Drop
Node 1
Forward α− 1 α− 1 −α− 1 α
Drop α − α− 1 −α − α
2.2 Network Model
We assume that nodes are selfish but not malicious. A selfish node is a ratio-
nal user that wants to maximize its own welfare, defined as the benefit minus
the cost of its actions. Links are assumed to be bidirectional. Wireless links
are often bidirectional, and many MAC layers require bidirectional packet
exchanges to avoid collisions, as is the case in IEEE 802.11. Finally, nodes
are assumed to operate in promiscuous mode, so they are able to listen to
all packets transmitted by their neighbors.
Forwarding a packet consumes resources. We define the normalized relay-
ing cost to be 1. The reward a node receives if its packet is relayed is α,
where we assume α ≥ 1 since the value of a packet should be at least equal
to the cost of the resources used to send it. We assume that the interaction
among nodes is reciprocal, i.e., any two neighbors have uniform network traf-
fic demands and need each other to forward packets. Thus, we can isolate
any pair of nodes and study the interaction between them as a two-player
game. Later in Section 2.5 we simulate a random network with asymmetric
and spatially non-uniform traffic without this assumption and test whether
our conclusions still hold.
In the two-player game, one way to model the nodes is to assume that
they send packets to each other and then simultaneously decide whether to
drop or forward their respective packets, and repeat this game iteratively. In
this scenario the stage payoffs matrix is given in Table 2.2. Without loss of
generality, we do an affine transformation to the payoff matrix as shown in
Table 2.3 using the following formula: let x be any entry in Table 2.2, and
let y be the respective entry in Table 2.3, then y = (x+ α)/(2α− 1) . Using
standard game theory notation, we will denote by i ∈ {1, 2} a generic node
and by −i its neighbor.
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Table 2.3: Affine Transformation to the Payoff Matrix of the Packet
Forwarding Game
Node 2
Forward Drop
Node 1
Forward 1 1 −1
2α−1
2α
2α−1
Drop 2α
2α−1
−1
2α−1
0 0
Since the interaction among nodes is asynchronous in nature, we refine the
game assuming that time is divided into slots and that slots last long enough
to allow each node to send a sufficiently large number of packets. At the
end of the slot each node finds the ratio of packets dropped by its neighbor;
if the number of packets exchanged is sufficiently large, then this ratio is a
good estimate of the probability of dropping a packet. This assumption is
implicitly used in other papers on reputation mechanisms as well [15,16].
Due to collisions, it is not always possible to detect whether a node for-
warded a packet. We define pe ∈ (0, 1) to be the probability that a packet
that has been forwarded was not overheard by the originating node. We
also assume that pe is the same for both nodes. (As mentioned before, in
Section 2.5 we test this assumption by simulating a non-uniform network to
compare with our analysis.) By listening to the channel, node i then es-
timates the perceived dropping probability pˆ
(k)
−i of its neighbor at time slot
k ≥ 0. It must be noted that a packet is perceived to be dropped if ei-
ther −i dropped it or if it is not dropped but node i did not overhear the
transmission. Thus
pˆ
(k)
−i = p
(k)
−i + (1− p
(k)
−i )pe = pe + (1− pe)p
(k)
−i , (2.1)
where p
(k)
−i is the probability that −i drops a packet.
Thus, using the payoffs of Table 2.3, the average payoff at time slot k is:
u
(k)
i = (1− p
(k)
i )(1− p
(k)
−i ) +
2α
2α− 1
p
(k)
i (1− p
(k)
−i )−
1
2α− 1
(1− p(k)i )p
(k)
−i .
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Table 2.4: Summary of Notation
Meaning
α Reward a node receives if a packet has been
relayed
pe Probability that a packet that has been
forwarded was not overheard by originating node
p
(k)
i Dropping probability of player i at time slot k
pˆ
(k)
i Perceived dropping probability of player i at
time slot k
p˜
(k)
i S Dropping probability player i should use at time
slot k according to strategy S
w Discount factor. Probability that both nodes
continue to interact after each time slot
u
(k)
i Player i’s average payoff at time slot k
U
(n)
i Discounted average payoff of player i starting
from time slot n
Rearranging terms:
u
(k)
i = 1 +
1
2α− 1
p
(k)
i −
2α
2α− 1
p
(k)
−i . (2.2)
The discounted average payoff of player i starting from time slot n is then
given by:
U
(n)
i =
∞∑
k=n
wk−nu
(k)
i , (2.3)
where w ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Since node i cannot know p(k)−i for
sure, it does not know its payoff either. However, we use the actual payoff
in the analysis since it tells us whether a given node can gain by deviating
from a strategy.
Given this game, each player is allowed to use a strategy to decide whether
to drop or forward packets based on the history. We use p˜
(k)
i S to denote the
dropping probability player i should use at time slot k according to strategy
S. For convenience, the definitions used are given in Table 2.4.
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2.3 Analysis of Prior Proposals
To motivate our new protocol, which we will present in the next section, in
this section we present a few strategies that have been proposed in prior work
and show their limitations.
2.3.1 Trigger Strategies
One idea to provide an incentive for cooperation is to develop a strategy such
that the cooperation of a node is measured and if the fraction of packets it
has dropped is above a threshold, it is considered selfish and is disconnected
for a given amount of time. Formally, an n-step trigger strategy is defined as:
p˜
(0)
i nT = 0
p˜
(k)
i nT =
{
0 if pˆ
(j)
−i ≤ T for all j ∈ {k − n, . . . , k − 1}
1 else,
where we define pˆ
(j)
−i = 0 for j ∈ Z−. From (2.1) it is easy to see that if node
i cooperates then pˆ
(k)
−i = pe for all k. Hence the optimal value of T = pe. In
reality we cannot perfectly estimate pe, so we have to analyze two cases:
1. If T < pe then we have that p˜
(k)
i nT = 1 for k ≥ 1, so cooperation will
never emerge.
2. If T > pe then player −i will be perceived to be cooperative as long as
it drops packets with probability:
p
(k)
−i ≤
T − pe
1− pe
.
Therefore, since pe is unknown, any choice of threshold other than T = pe
results in either all packets being dropped or some fraction of packets being
dropped. In other words, full cooperation is never the Nash equilibrium point
with trigger strategies.
Variations on this strategy have been used in several reputation mecha-
nisms, where the different proposals focus on ideas on how to detect self-
ish behavior and then proceed to isolate selfish nodes: Catch [16], CONFI-
DANT [13], OCEAN [14], and the reputation-based mechanism in [18] are
11
among them.
2.3.2 Tit For Tat
A second alternative is to use a Tit For Tat (TFT) strategy [21]. It was
generalized in [22] for the wireless context as follows:
p˜
(0)
i TFT = 0
p˜
(k)
i TFT = pˆ
(k−1)
−i for k ≥ 1.
However, Milan et al. [22] proved that this strategy does not provide the
right incentive either for cooperation in wireless networks.
In RMS [19] the selfishness of a node is classified into one of several different
levels, and punishment is given according to the level. Such a strategy can
then be considered to implement a discretized version of TFT, as opposed to
the continuous version presented here.
2.3.3 Generous Tit For Tat
The problem with TFT is that it does not take into account the fact that it
is not always possible to determine whether a packet was relayed or not due
to collisions. A way to deal with this is by using a generosity factor g that
allows cooperation to be restored. Such a strategy is known as Generous
TFT (GTFT) [23] and in the case of wireless networks it can be defined [22]
as follows1:
p˜
(0)
i GTFT = 0
p˜
(k)
i GTFT = max{pˆ
(k−1)
−i − g, 0} for k ≥ 1.
Lemma 2. If both nodes do not deviate from the GTFT strategy, then the
generosity factor that maximizes the discounted average payoff is g∗ ≥ pe. ⋄
Proof. If g ≥ pe then from (2.1) we have for all k ≥ 0 and i ∈ {1, 2} that
p
(k)
i = 0. Using (2.2) and (2.3) we obtain:
U
(0)
i =
1
1− w
. (2.4)
1Note that this definition corresponds to a reputation-based mechanism, not to be
confused with the credit-based mechanism proposed in [6] that bears the same name.
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In the case g < pe we obtain:
p
(0)
i = 0
and for k ≥ 1:
p
(k)
i = (pe − g)
k−1∑
n=0
(1− pe)
n = (pe − g)
1− (1− pe)
k
pe
.
So the stage payoffs for k ≥ 1 are:
u
(k)
i =
1
pe
[
g + (pe − g)(1− pe)
k
]
.
Therefore the discounted average payoff is:
U
(0)
i = 1 +
w
pe
[
g
1− w
+
(pe − g)(1− pe)
1− w(1− pe)
]
. (2.5)
It can easily be checked that the payoff (2.5) is strictly less than the payoff
(2.4).
It is important to highlight that in the case g > pe GTFT is not a Nash
equilibrium since for player −i, it pays to deviate dropping packets with a
probability
p
(k)
−i ≤
g − pe
1− pe
.
The following theorem and corollary tell us that if the interaction between
two nodes lasts long enough, then GTFT is a robust strategy where no node
can gain by deviating from the expected behavior, even if it is not able to
achieve full cooperation.
Theorem 1. GTFT is subgame perfect if and only if
g ≤ pe and w >
1
2α(1− pe)
.
⋄
(See the proof in Appendix A.)
Corollary 1. If both nodes use GTFT then cooperation is achieved on the
equilibrium path if and only if g = pe. ⋄
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Figure 2.1: GTFT’s subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) region for
α = 2
Note that in [22] a proof was done for the case g = pe but only considering
the equilibrium path. The subgame perfect region of GTFT is plotted in
Fig. 2.1 for α = 2. Figure 2.2 shows how the shape of this region is affected
by different values of α. Note that when the value of a packet grows larger
compared to the actual cost of transmitting it, then cooperation has a better
chance to emerge since being connected is more important than reducing the
cost of helping other nodes. In summary, GTFT is not satisfactory because
in order to achieve full cooperation we need a perfect estimate of pe. Such a
strategy has been used in SORI [15] to punish selfish behavior.
2.4 DARWIN
In this section we introduce our algorithm, and we prove that our strategy
is subgame perfect, achieves cooperation on the equilibrium path, and can
cope with a group of colluding nodes. We end the section discussing some
possible security issues and how they can be solved.
2.4.1 Definition
Our goal is to propose a reputation strategy that does not depend on a perfect
estimation of pe to achieve full cooperation and that is also more robust
14
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Figure 2.2: Sensitivity of GTFT’s subgame perfect region for different
values of α
than previously proposed strategies. For the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,
a modification of TFT known as Contrite Tit For Tat (CTFT) [24, 25] has
been proposed based on the idea of contriteness: a player that made a mistake
and unintentionally defected should exercise contrition and try to correct the
error instead of going into a retaliation situation. This strategy depends on
the notion of good standing and is defined as follows. A player is always in
good standing in the first stage. It remains in good standing as long as it
cooperates when CTFT specifies that it should cooperate. If an individual
is in bad standing it can recover good standing by cooperating in one stage.
Then CTFT specifies that a player should cooperate if it is in bad standing,
or if its opponent is in good standing; otherwise the player should defect.
Inspired by this strategy, for the case of wireless networks we define the
following strategy:
p˜
(k)
i DARWIN =
[
γ
(
q
(k−1)
−i − q
(k−1)
i
)]1
0
for k ≥ 0, (2.6)
where we define for i = {1, 2}:
q
(k)
i =


[
pˆ
(k)
i − p˜
(k)
i DARWIN
]1
0
for k ≥ 0
0 for k = −1.
(2.7)
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Additionally we define the function:
[x]10 =


1 if x ≥ 1
x if 0 < x < 1
0 if x ≤ 0
.
Recall that pˆ
(k)
i denotes the estimated dropping probability and p˜
(k)
i DARWIN
is the dropping probability under DARWIN. Thus, if pˆ
(k)
i > p˜
(k)
i DARWIN , it
means node i is perceived to be dropping more packets than it should under
DARWIN. The parameter q
(k)
i measures this deviation. In this case q
(k)
i acts
as a measurement of the standing of a node, and only the player that has
better standing should punish its opponent in proportion to the difference
between the two standings instead of the absolute value of the standing of
its opponent. The limitation on any strategy is that it requires that the
interaction between the nodes last long enough for the reputation mechanism
to be effective. This is translated in a feasible set for the parameter w, the
probability that both nodes continue to interact after each time slot. In the
case of DARWIN, γ determines the set of feasible values of w: the larger
the punishment factor γ, up to an upper bound, the shorter the interaction
between the nodes can be. This relationship will be quantitatively presented
in Theorem 2.
2.4.2 Performance Guarantees
The following theorem proves that when the interaction between two nodes
lasts long enough, DARWIN is a robust strategy where no node can gain by
deviating from the expected behavior.
Theorem 2. Assuming 1 < γ < p−1e , DARWIN is subgame perfect if and
only if
w > max
{
1
γ
,
1
2α(1− peγ) + peγ
}
. (2.8)
⋄
(See the proof in Appendix B.)
From (2.8) it is clear that the optimum value of γ that minimizes this
bound is a function of α and pe. Since one cannot estimate α, a suboptimal
16
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Figure 2.3: Sensitivity of DARWIN’s subgame perfect region for different
values of α, assuming (2.9) holds
strategy could be to choose γ to be the average of the interval (1, p−1e ):
γ =
1 + p−1e
2
=
1 + pe
2pe
. (2.9)
Figure 2.3 shows the subgame perfect region of DARWIN for different val-
ues of α, assuming (2.9) holds, which is not significantly different from the
subgame perfect region if we had used the optimal value of γ.
It must be highlighted that if both nodes use DARWIN then full coopera-
tion is achieved. This can easily be checked using (2.1) and the definition of
DARWIN to observe the game evolution.
Lemma 3. If both nodes use DARWIN then cooperation is achieved on the
equilibrium path. That is, p
(k)
i = p
(k)
−i = 0 for all k ≥ 0. ⋄
Since this is the best any strategy S can achieve, we have that:
U
(0)
i S ≤ U
(0)
i DARWIN for any strategy S. (2.10)
It is also important to remember that for DARWIN to be subgame perfect
we need to estimate pe in order to achieve the bound γ < p
−1
e . Since we
cannot do perfect estimation, we have that the estimated error probability
p
(e)
e is equal to
p(e)e = pe +∆,
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where ∆ ∈ (−pe, 1 − pe) is the estimation error. If we choose γ using (2.9)
we have:
γ =
1 + p
(e)
e
2p
(e)
e
=
1 + pe +∆
2pe + 2∆
.
So we have that γ < p−1e if and only if:
∆ > −pe
(
1− pe
2− pe
)
.
Thus, for the DARWIN strategy, one does not need a precise estimate of pe;
an estimator that overestimates pe is sufficient for Theorem 2 to hold.
2.4.3 Collusion Resistance
We now consider the case when a group of colluding nodes work together to
maximize their own benefit regardless of the social optimum. Define U
(0)
i Si|S−i
to be the discounted average payoff of player i using strategy Si when it plays
against player −i using strategy S−i. Hence (2.10) can be rewritten as:
U
(0)
i S|S ≤ U
(0)
i D|D for any strategy S. (2.11)
Also, a consequence of Theorem 2 is
U
(0)
i S|D < U
(0)
i D|D (2.12)
for any strategy S 6= D =DARWIN. Assume a group of colluding nodes
implementing strategy S enters the network. Define pS ∈ (0, 1) to be the
probability that a node that implements DARWIN interacts with a colluding
node. Therefore the average payoff to a cooperative node will be:
U(D) = pSU
(0)
i D|S + (1− pS)U
(0)
i D|D.
Similarly, if pD ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that a colluding node interacts with
a node implementing DARWIN, we have:
U(S) = pDU
(0)
i S|D + (1− pD)U
(0)
i S|S.
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We have that the average payoff is bounded by
U(S) ≤ max
{
U
(0)
i S|D, U
(0)
i S|S
}
. (2.13)
So a group of colluding nodes cannot gain from unilaterally deviating if and
only if U(S) < U(D). Equivalently,
pS
[
U
(0)
i D|D − U
(0)
i D|S
]
< U
(0)
i D|D − U(S). (2.14)
From (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) we know that
U
(0)
i D|D − U(S) ≥ 0.
Definition 5. Strategy S is a naive strategy if
U
(0)
i D|D < U
(0)
i D|S. (2.15)
That is, strategy S is exploited when matched against DARWIN. Further-
more, a non-naive strategy is one such that (2.15) does not hold. ⋄
From (2.14), we have proved the following theorem:
Theorem 3. DARWIN is collusion-resistant against a naive strategy. Fur-
thermore, it is resistant against a non-naive strategy if and only if
pS <
U
(0)
i D|D − U(S)
U
(0)
i D|D − U
(0)
i D|S
.
⋄
Thus if cooperative nodes mostly interact among each other then DARWIN
can resist group attacks.
2.4.4 Security Issues
In this section, we will comment on possible security issues in implement-
ing DARWIN. Since our solutions to these issues rely on other works, our
discussion will be brief.
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Short Term Identities and Sybil Attacks
Nodes can change identities to avoid detection or to help spread false values to
improve their own reputation. To cope with this we can use a proof-of-effort
approach, first suggested for ad hoc networks in [14]: a node that claims
to be entering the network for the first time must show that it has spent
some effort creating its identity, otherwise it is not allowed to connect. Since
memory access speeds vary across machines much less than CPU speeds, the
approach uses a memory-bound function [26,27]. Its two main properties are
that its computing time is determined by the memory access speed and not
the CPU speed, and that it is moderately hard to compute but very easy
to verify. This approach tends to be more egalitarian and tries to avoid the
problem posed to the network by selfish users with high-end computers, since
they could potentially spend less CPU time with the burden of creating new
identities.
Node Impersonation
Selfish nodes can try to impersonate cooperative nodes in order to boost
their reputation or to request other nodes to forward their own packets.
This problem can be solved generating a shared secret key among each pair
of nodes and using it in conjunction with a message authentication code. The
key can be safely exchanged over an insecure channel using the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange algorithm [28].
2.5 Simulations
In this section we first present a possible implementation of our reputation
mechanism and later we will present the settings and results of our simula-
tion study of the performance of DARWIN against the strategies studied in
Section 2.3.
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2.5.1 Algorithm Implementation
Let N
(k)
i denote the set of one-hop neighbors that node i has discovered in
time interval k by overhearing packet transmissions. For every node j ∈ N (k)i ,
node i keeps two counters, one for the number of messages sent to j for
forwarding (S
(k)
ij ) in time slot k and another for the number of messages j
actually forwarded (F
(k)
ij ) in time interval k. At the end of the time slot it
computes the ratio
c
(k)
ij =
F
(k)
ij
S
(k)
ij
and proceeds to send c
(k)
ij to its neighbors. With the values gathered, node i
estimates j’s average connectivity ratio
cˆ
(k)
j =
∑
m∈N
(k)
i
∪{i}
m6=j
c
(k)
im × c
(k)
mj
∑
m∈N
(k)
i
∪{i}
m6=j
c
(k)
im
,
where by definition c
(k)
ii = 1 for all k. It must be noted that the average is
weighted with the perceived connectivity ratio that node i measured from
node m. This helps to avoid sybil attacks that spread false values in order
to improve a selfish node’s reputation since all its other identities have low
connectivity, too, and therefore a small impact on the average. In a similar
way, node i will find cˆ
(k)
i , the average connectivity ratio its one-hop neigh-
borhood perceived from it during time slot k. We define pˆ
(k)
j = 1− cˆ
(k)
j and
use (2.6) and (2.7) to find the dropping probability that node i will use while
forwarding packets for node j in time interval k + 1.
Since we need γ < p−1e , we need to estimate pe. An interesting solution was
proposed in [16] probing a node with anonymous messages, but it increases
the overhead of the protocol. Instead, note that pe is the probability that
at least one terminal in N
(k)
i transmits when node j transmits. Thus we
estimate pe by measuring the fraction of time during which at least one node
other than j transmits. Call it pˆej. Mathematically, if T
(k)
j is the fraction of
time during which node j has transmitted up to time interval k and T
(k)
c is
the fraction of time during which a collision occurred up to time interval k
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we have:
pˆej = T
(k)
c +
∑
n∈N
(k)
i
n6=j
T (k)n .
In case the MAC layer uses a CSMA/CA protocol, and due to the exposed
terminal problem, we will have that pˆej ≥ pe. This overestimation is not a
problem for our algorithm since
γ <
1
pˆej
≤
1
pe
.
2.5.2 Settings
Our goal is to study the network performance of the different strategies pre-
sented in Section 2.3 and how they compare against DARWIN. To do that we
used the network simulator ns-2. For the propagation we used the two-ray
ground reflection model, while the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination
Function (DCF) was used at the MAC layer. Nodes had a physical radio
range of 250 m and a raw bandwidth of 2 Mbps. Routing was performed by
the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. We simulated a network of 50
nodes randomly placed in an area of 670× 670 m2 that implement a reputa-
tion mechanism in a given simulation run, where we randomly selected five
nodes that do not implement such strategy and behave selfishly by dropping
all packets that are not destined to them. In the rest of this section, a selfish
node will be taken to mean a node that does not implement the reputation
mechanism and a cooperative node one that does. Unless otherwise noted,
there are 14 source-destination pairs and each source transmits at a constant
bit rate (CBR) of 2 packets/s, with a packet size of 512 bytes. The simula-
tion time is 800 s, where the time intervals used are 60 s long. Each figure
presents an average of 120 randomly generated runs.
Since our goal is to study the different strategies and not specific implemen-
tations, all cooperative nodes use the implementation suggested in Section
2.5.1 to test node behavior and share reputation values. The only exception
is the strategy used to punish selfish behavior. For the case when nodes
implement the n-step trigger strategy, the threshold T is set to be 0.2, while
n = 5. For GTFT we set the parameter g to be 0.1, while for DARWIN we
set γ to be 2.
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Figure 2.4: Number of forwarded packets for different numbers of
source-destination pairs
2.5.3 Results
Before presenting the results of our simulation study, we would like to em-
phasize the fact that, as proved in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, DARWIN can help
restore cooperation under a larger set of conditions on nodes interactions, is
more robust against imperfect knowledge of network parameters compared
to other strategies, and is a self-enforcing strategy where no node or group of
colluding nodes can obtain a gain from deviating from our strategy. These de-
sirable characteristics for any reputation mechanism mean that the chances
that a rational user deviates from the strategy and behaves selfishly are
smaller under DARWIN than under the other strategies studied; averting
such behavior is the ultimate goal of a mechanism that tries to incentivize
cooperation. The simulations complement these theoretical conclusions by
assuming that some nodes are rogue users and behave selfishly.
To evaluate network performance, we measure the total number of for-
warded packets. In Figure 2.4 we explore the effect of varying the total
number of source-destination pairs. It is apparent that the throughput gap
for cooperative nodes increases with the number of connections. The reason
for this is that when there are more active connections the probability that
a node does not listen when a packet is being forwarded increases, leading
to an increased number of misunderstandings where cooperative nodes are
deemed to be acting selfishly. This increases the level of retaliation situa-
tions in TFT and the n-step trigger strategies. It can be noted that when the
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Figure 2.5: Number of forwarded packets for different connection rates (for
a packet size of 512 bytes)
number of connections is greater than 18 there is a decrease in throughput
in GTFT compared to DARWIN. As explained in Section 2.3.3, to achieve
full cooperation GTFT requires a perfect estimation of the probability pe
that a packet that has been forwarded was not overheard by the originating
node. Since we keep constant the generosity factor g in our simulations, once
pe > g when the number of connections is large enough, we have that network
throughput starts to decrease. This behavior is also evident in Figure 2.5,
where the relationship between source rate and the number of forwarded
packets is presented. Since DARWIN does not require a perfect estimate of
pe but an overestimation suffices, as explained in Section 2.4.2, and since it
compensates for the misunderstandings between cooperative nodes, we see
that the advantage of using DARWIN over other strategies is more apparent
when the network becomes heavily congested.
Figure 2.6 explores the impact of the fraction of selfish nodes, where the
figure presented is the average of 240 randomly generated runs instead of 120
as in the rest of the plots, showing the average number of forwarded packets
per node for both selfish and cooperative nodes. This was done because the
confidence intervals for this plot tended to be larger than for the other plots
when we only used 120 runs. Since the goal of this plot is to highlight the
difference in throughput between cooperative and selfish nodes, and not the
throughput difference between competing strategies as it has already been
studied in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, we run our simulations in the low traffic
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regime.
As expected, the total throughput of cooperative nodes decreases propor-
tionally when the number of selfish nodes increases. This is due to the fact
that since the number of selfish nodes increases, the total number of packets
being dropped increases proportionally. In this case, it can be seen that the
average number of forwarded packets for cooperative nodes is larger than the
one for selfish nodes, even when 90% of the nodes act selfishly. The fact that
the difference between the throughput decreases is less relevant than the fact
that selfishness does not improve performance. It can also be noted that
of all the strategies simulated, the n-step trigger has the harshest punish-
ment for selfish behavior, but at the cost of significantly decreasing network
throughput for cooperative nodes.
In Figure 2.7 we study the effect of mobility on the effectiveness of the pun-
ishment mechanisms, where the sources transmit at a rate of 4 packets/s. The
mobility model used is the random waypoint model, where a node moves to a
random destination at a speed uniformly distributed between 0 and 20 m/s,
and once it reaches the destination it remains there for a specified pause time
before choosing its next destination. To complement our simulation study, in
this figure we include in the comparison CORE [12,17]. As can be observed,
the more the nodes move, the less throughput they get, since the routing
algorithm sends packets to stalled routes, which eventually leads to packet
dropping. However, the performance of DARWIN remains superior to that of
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Figure 2.8: Overhead of DARWIN
the other strategies, showing that the mechanism is better able to incentivize
cooperation even in the case when nodes roam.
In summary, nodes that are selfish are punished similarly by most proto-
cols, but nodes that implement DARWIN get much better throughput than
nodes that implement n-step trigger or TFT strategies. Furthermore, the
throughput of DARWIN is better than that of GTFT in heavily loaded net-
works.
One important aspect of every protocol is the overhead that results from
its implementation. Figure 2.8 explores this for different source rates when
all nodes implement DARWIN compared to the same network when all nodes
are cooperative and do not run DARWIN. DARWIN (and, for that matter,
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any other reputation mechanism) incurs a certain fixed overhead associated
with sharing and processing reputation information; thus, as expected, the
fraction of overhead packets to data packets is higher at low loads but smaller
at high loads. This feature is desirable since resources are at a premium at
high loads.
2.6 Related Work
Incentive mechanisms can be broadly divided in two categories, according
to the techniques they use to enforce cooperation: credit-based schemes and
reputation-based schemes. Here we present a review of the previous work
done in both areas.
2.6.1 Credit-Based Schemes
The strategy proposed in [8] is based on a nuglet counter that increases
every time a node forwards a packet, and decreases by the estimated number
of intermediate nodes every time a packet is sent. A node is only allowed
to send a packet if its nuglet counter remains positive after the operation.
Therefore, if a node wants to be able to transmit, it has to cooperate. This
scheme requires tamper resistant hardware, but this kind of hardware must
be trusted with caution [29]. Sprite [7] avoids the use of tamper resistant
hardware by storing receipts of forwarded packets, and later they are cleared
with a central trusted authority that distributes the credits to cooperative
nodes. The drawback is the need for an infrastructure to operate, which
may hinder its ability to gain widespread acceptance, e.g., in post-disaster
networks.
An algorithm called Generous Tit For Tat (GTFT) has been proposed in
[6]: a node agrees to forward packets in a session if and only if the throughput
received by the node from the network so far is greater than the throughput
given to the network minus a generosity factor; if a node decides to reject
a session, it informs the source so it can establish another path. Assuming
that misbehaving nodes do not lie about their actual actions, Srinivasan et
al. [6] proved that no node has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the
GTFT strategy.
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In [9], a pricing mechanism is studied through fluid-level simulations. It has
been demonstrated that users’ prices and credit balances stabilize for fixed
ad hoc networks, where nodes in the center of the network have an advantage
since they can act as relay nodes for a larger number of routes. Ad hoc VCG
[10] is a reactive routing protocol that implements a variation of the VCG
mechanism. As is mentioned in [10], the protocol has considerable overhead
on the route discovery phase if communication sessions between two nodes
are usually short or the routing path frequently changes during a session;
additionally, to guarantee truthfulness and cost-efficiency it is required that
every node have complete and up-to-date knowledge of the underlying graph,
so techniques such as route caches are not suitable with this protocol.
2.6.2 Reputation-Based Schemes
In [11] the reputation mechanism performs two functions: (i) identifies mis-
behaving nodes by monitoring packet forwarding, and (ii) helps the routing
protocol avoid those nodes by informing the source node that there are selfish
nodes on its path. The source node can use this information to find alter-
nate paths. Hence, the mechanism only tries to avoid selfish nodes, but the
behavior is not discouraged. CONFIDANT [13] goes one step further and
after a selfish node is detected, it is isolated; however, it relies on building a
“friends” list that is imprinted in every node on a user-to-user basis.
In SORI [15] and Catch [16] the spreading of reputation information is
limited to one-hop neighbors. SORI evaluates the reputation of a node by
weighting the information of all its neighbors and then punishes it, if nec-
essary, with a Generous Tit For Tat strategy. Catch uses control messages
to reduce the impact of collisions on estimating reputation, and a trigger
strategy to punish selfish behavior.
CORE [12,17] keeps a counter to keep track of the neighbor’s lastB actions,
where the counter is increased by 1 every time the node cooperates, and
decreased by 1 every time it defects. If the counter is positive, CORE will
cooperate; otherwise it will punish its neighbor by defecting.
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CHAPTER 3
ADMISSION CONTROL AND ROUTING IN
MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS
Future multi-hop wireless networks will carry a host of multimedia services
such as voice calls and video conferencing. A common feature of such services
is that they require quality of service (QoS) guarantees; specifically we con-
sider services that require a pre-specified bandwidth between the endpoints
of the flow. To support such services, the network must be equipped with a
protocol to decide whether or not to accept a new request, and to find a route
with sufficient bandwidth for an admitted flow. Optimal admission control
and routing for pre-specified bandwidth flows has been extensively studied
for wireline networks. In the case of wireless networks, a number of papers
have highlighted the difficulties in designing good QoS routing algorithms.
In particular, the importance of taking contention count into consideration
for available bandwidth estimation has been recognized in [30, 31] and the
importance of load balancing to maximize the number of admitted flows has
been highlighted in [32]. However, no provably optimal algorithm has been
developed to the best of our knowledge.
The idea of achieving provably good performance without any modeling
assumptions on the arrival requests was proposed in [33–35], based on the
concept of competitive ratio [36–39]. Informally, competitive ratio measures
the performance loss of a given algorithm caused by imperfect decisions due
to the fact that it is oblivious of the future when compared against an off-line
algorithm that has complete a priori knowledge of the sequence of requests,
including the future, and can therefore make perfect decisions. For reasons
that we will describe next, it is difficult to immediately adapt the competitive
ratio-based routing algorithms to wireless networks.
The wireless channel is a shared resource, so there is resource contention
among transmissions from different nodes. As a result, even if a flow requests
a pre-specified bandwidth from the network, the load imposed by a flow on a
node is a function of the topology of the network (for example, the number
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of neighbors and hidden terminals) and the choice of the route itself. Hence,
unlike a wireline network where the bandwidth consumed by a flow along
a link is known at the arrival time of a flow, in a wireless network, the
load imposed by a flow on a node can only be determined during route
discovery. Therefore, it is not immediately obvious that the techniques for
deriving optimal QoS routing algorithms for wireline networks can be applied
to wireless networks.
In this chapter, our contributions are as follows:
• We first develop a model for QoS routing in multi-hop wireless networks
which allows us to derive an admission control and routing algorithm
with provable performance guarantees using competitive analysis.
• We then show that no other algorithm performs better in an asymptotic
sense to be described later. The proof of this result is more involved
and relies on the unique characteristics of wireless networks.
• The optimal algorithm is not in a form that is amenable to distributed
implementation. Thus, an important contribution is to convert the
algorithm into a form that allows the use of standard shortest-path
algorithms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents an
overview of previous related work. Competitive analysis theory is presented
in Section 3.2. The network model and definitions are described in Sec-
tion 3.3, while in Section 3.4 we introduce our algorithm and use the com-
petitive analysis theory to prove performance guarantees. Section 3.5 proves
that our algorithm is asymptotically optimal with respect to the competi-
tive ratio. We show how the algorithm can be implemented in a distributed
fashion in Section 3.6. The proofs are included in the appendices.
3.1 Related Work
Finding algorithms to support quality of service in multi-hop networks has
been an active topic of research in the last several years. Reference [31]
studies the problem of bandwidth estimation at a node while [30, 40] study
the problem of estimating the impact of contention in the available bandwidth
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in a multi-hop path. In [41,42] some heuristics are presented to support QoS
but the effect of contention in the admission process is ignored. The work
in [43] takes into account contention under the implicit assumption that the
interference range of a node is equal to its transmission range.
In [44] the use of packet scheduling to guarantee QoS in multi-hop networks
is studied. Some proposals rely on a central algorithm to do admission control
[45, 46], while others have proposed strategies assuming a TDMA [47–49]
or CDMA over TDMA [50, 51] layer. The work in [52] explores how to
provide implicit synchronization in CSMA/CA networks to achieve TDM-
like performance.
A solution for multichannel multi-hop networks has been proposed in [32]
under the assumption that requests can be split; if requests are non-splittable
a heuristic is introduced where requests are routed in the least-congested,
minimum-hop path. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first
provably optimal for general networks that allows a distributed implementa-
tion.
3.2 Competitive Analysis
The concept of competitive ratio was first introduced by [36] and further
developed by [37–39]. Here we will present a brief overview of this theory.
In many situations we must develop efficient algorithms which have to
deal with a sequence of tasks one at a time, where the efficiency of current
decisions is affected by future tasks. One classical example is the well-known
ski rental problem, where a ski enthusiast plans on skiing for several days
while weather permits. Our ski fan is faced with two options every day:
either rent skis for the day at a price of r or buy them at cost b. If we knew
that the total number of days to ski is d, then the optimal decision algorithm
would be to buy skis if b < rd. Since we have no knowledge of the future,
we have to develop an algorithm that has to make decisions on a day by day
basis and still performs well. To do that we introduce the concepts of on-line
and off-line algorithm.
Definition 6. An on-line algorithm is an algorithm that has to deal with a
sequence of requests one at a time, without having the entire sequence avail-
able from the beginning. ⋄
31
Definition 7. An off-line algorithm is an algorithm that has complete a
priori knowledge of the entire request sequence, including future requests,
before it outputs its answer to solve the problem at hand. ⋄
One way to measure the performance of an on-line algorithm is by com-
paring it against the best possible off-line algorithm when both have to deal
with the same set of requests. The competitive ratio then measures the per-
formance loss of an on-line algorithm caused by imperfect decisions when
compared against an off-line algorithm that can make perfect decisions since
it has complete knowledge of the request sequence.
Definition 8. The competitive ratio of an on-line algorithm is the supremum
over all possible request sequences of the performance ratio between the best
possible off-line algorithm and the on-line algorithm. ⋄
This means that if an on-line algorithm has a competitive ratio of c then
its performance is at least 1/c the performance of the best possible off-line
algorithm for any request sequence, and for a given performance measure.
3.3 Network Model
The network is composed of a set N of N nodes, where node n ∈ N has
capacity u(n). Without loss of generality, in the rest of the chapter we will
assume that
u(n) = 1 for all n ∈ N . (3.1)
The input to the algorithm is a set of flow requests F = {f1, f2, . . . , fk},
where flow j is specified by
fj =
{
sj, dj, rj(t), t
S
j , t
F
j , ρj
}
.
Nodes sj and dj are the source and destination respectively of a unidirec-
tional flow.1 Flow j requests a bandwidth rj(t) at time t, where we define
rj(t) = 0 for t /∈ [ t
S
j , t
F
j ). Thus, t
S
j and t
F
j are the start and finish times of
flow j. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that these
times are integers. A profit of ρj is accrued if the flow is admitted into the
1For the case of bidirectional flows, we simply need to split the request in two unidi-
rectional flows that need to be accepted/rejected simultaneously.
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network. Given fj ∈ F , our algorithm will output a path Pj assigned for the
request, with the understanding that Pj = ∅ if it is rejected.
Let λn(t) be the relative load on node n at time t, which is a function
of the flows currently admitted by our algorithm. Flow j’s holding time is
denoted by Tj = t
F
j − t
S
j , where we define the maximum holding time
T = max
j
{Tj} .
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the wireless channel is a
shared resource and contention among transmissions from different nodes
implies that when admitting a flow we must take into account the impact
of a flow in the network. To better understand this, let us use the simple
scenario of Fig. 3.1. Our linear network of 5 nodes is such that any node can
only communicate with its nearest neighbors, and the interference range for
each node is illustrated as a concentric circle around each node. There is a
flow from node B to node D that requires a rate of r. Due to the exposed
terminal problem, node A cannot transmit while B is transmitting, so node
A’s available capacity is
u(A)− r
(3.1)
= 1− r,
where
(3.1)
= means that the equality follows from equation (3.1). We use this
notation throughout the chapter.
Thus, when scheduling this flow, we must reserve a rate of r in node A for it
to remain idle. Similarly, node B must transmit at a rate r and must remain
silent while C is relaying a packet for this flow, which implies a resource
reservation of rate 2r at B. Because of the hidden terminal problem, node
E must remain idle while D is receiving a packet, so we have to reserve a
rate of r at this node. Following the lines of this argument, it can be checked
that we must reserve a rate of 2r at nodes C and D in order to be able to
schedule this flow. These values are shown above each node in Fig. 3.1.
This example gives the intuition for the following definition. Let Qn(Pj)
be the impact of flow j on node n if path Pj is used. Formally,
Qn(Pj) =
∑
n′∈Nn
I{n′∈Pj}
(
I{n′ 6=dj} + I{n′∈HTn(Pj)}
)
, (3.2)
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Figure 3.1: Example of resource contention among nodes
where Nn is the set of nodes within interference range of node n (including
node n itself), HTn(Pj) is the set of nodes in Nn that need to receive a
transmission for flow j that node n cannot sense—that is, hidden terminal
transmissions—and I{} is the indicator function defined as
I{statement} =
{
1 if statement = TRUE
0 if statement = FALSE
.
As an example, in Fig. 3.1 we have that for path P = {B,C,D}, QA(P ) =
1, QC(P ) = 2, and QE(P ) = 1. It must be noted that this definition is only
an upper bound on the actual impact of a flow in a given node, and can only
be improved by assuming a specific, possibly ideal, transmission scheduling
algorithm. To illustrate this, in Fig. 3.2 we assume that there is a flow from
node A to E and that we schedule node transmissions such that nodes A
and D simultaneously transmit at time t0, node B transmits at t1, and C is
scheduled to transmit at time t2. In this case, the impact of the flow on node
C is 3 instead of 4, as estimated using Qn(Pj).
2
Finding methods for estimating Qn(Pj) has been an active topic of re-
search. For related work, the reader is referred to [30,40,43].
Define QT (Pj) to be the total impact of flow j (routed on path Pj) on the
network. Thus,
QT (Pj) =
∑
n∈N
Qn(Pj). (3.3)
2It must be highlighted that, for ease of explanation, we have assumed that due to
the exposed terminal problem a node cannot transmit while another in its interference
neighborhood is transmitting. If a certain physical layer technology does not preclude such
transmissions, the definition of Qn(Pj) should be modified accordingly and the results in
the rest of the chapter still apply with minor modifications.
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Figure 3.2: Example of resource contention among nodes under the
assumption of perfect packet transmission scheduling
Additionally, define QT and Q as follows:
QT = max
j
{QT (Pj)}
Q = max
j,n
{Qn(Pj)} . (3.4)
We normalize the cost such that, for any flow fj ∈ F and any time such
that rj(t) > 0,
1 ≤
ρj
QT rj(t)Tj
≤ F (3.5)
for F large enough. For example, if we have that rj(t) = rj for t ∈ [ t
S
j , t
F
j )
and the profit is defined to be proportional to the bandwidth-holding time
product, i.e. throughput, then we can make ρj = QT rjTj and let F = 1.
Finally, we assume that rate requirements are small enough compared to
node capacity. Specifically,
rj(t) ≤
min
n
{u(n)}
Q log µ
(3.1)
=
1
Q log µ
(3.6)
where
µ = 2 (1 +QTTF ) , (3.7)
and log means log2.
Later we will prove in Section 3.5 that (3.6) is a necessary condition for
any algorithm to achieve logarithmic competitive ratio.
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3.4 Algorithm
The main goal is to develop an admission control and routing algorithm that
enforces capacity constraints, that is
λn(t) ≤ 1 for all t and n ∈ N , (3.8)
and maximizes profit: ∑
j:Pj 6=∅
ρj.
Furthermore, the algorithm cannot rely on knowledge about future flows
to make admission decisions and once a flow has been admitted no rerouting
is allowed and no flow is to be interrupted. To do that, it will sequentially
analyze flows from F and decide whether to admit them or not.
3.4.1 Definition
The decision rule for admitting flow fj ∈ F and assigning a path is:
1. For all t ∈ [ tSj , t
F
j ), n ∈ N let the cost of node n at time t be
cn(t) = u(n)
[
µλn(t) − 1
] (3.1)
= µλn(t) − 1. (3.9)
2. If there exists a path Pj from node sj to dj such that
∑
n∈N
∑
tSj ≤t<t
F
j
Qn(Pj)
rj(t)
u(n)
cn(t) ≤ ρj (3.10)
then route fj using Pj and set
λn(t)← λn(t) +Qn(Pj)
rj(t)
u(n)
(3.11)
for all n ∈ N , tSj ≤ t < t
F
j .
Note that
Qn(Pj)
rj(t)
u(n)
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is the fraction of node n’s capacity that would be used by flow j. Thus, the
algorithm compares the link cost weighted by this quantity to the profit and
admits the call if the cost is less than or equal to the profit.
3.4.2 Performance Guarantees
Now that the wireless model and the algorithm are defined, we can use the
techniques developed for wireline networks in [33]. We will first proceed to
prove that our algorithm enforces capacity constraints, which from now on
we will call the Admission Control and Routing (ACR) algorithm. In other
words, if the ACR algorithm decides to admit a flow request, then there is
sufficient available capacity.
Lemma 4. Capacity constraints are enforced by the ACR algorithm. That
is,
λn(t) ≤ 1 for all t and n ∈ N .
⋄
(See the proof in Appendix C.)
The proof of the competitiveness of the ACR algorithm is done in two
steps. In Lemma 5 we prove that the total network cost is at most within a
factor of the accrued gain, and in Lemma 6 we prove that the profit due to
requests rejected by the ACR algorithm and accepted by the optimal off-line
algorithm is bounded by the total network cost. These two results then imply
that the profit of the ACR algorithm is within a factor of the profit accrued
by the off-line algorithm, and hence the competitive ratio is bounded.
For the following two lemmas, define λn(t, j) to be the relative load on
node n at time t when only the first j − 1 flow requests have been either
admitted or rejected. That is,
λn(t, j)
(3.11)
=
∑
i<j
Qn(Pi)
ri(t)
u(n)
(3.1)
=
∑
i<j
Qn(Pi)ri(t), (3.12)
with the understanding that Pi = ∅ if fi ∈ {f1, f2, . . . , fj−1} is rejected.
Similarly, and from (3.9), let cn(t, j) be defined as
cn(t, j) = µ
λn(t,j) − 1. (3.13)
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Lemma 5. Let AACR be the set of indices of accepted flows by the ACR
algorithm and k be the index of the last flow request in F . Then,
2 log µ
∑
j∈AACR
ρj ≥
∑
t
∑
n
cn(t, k + 1).
⋄
(See the proof in Appendix D.)
Lemma 6. Let AO\A be the set of indices of accepted requests by the optimal
off-line algorithm but rejected by the ACR algorithm. Let m = max
{
AO\A
}
.
Then ∑
j∈AO\A
ρj ≤
∑
n
∑
t
cn(t,m).
⋄
(See the proof in Appendix E.)
Now, we are ready to prove the following:
Theorem 4. The ACR algorithm enforces capacity constraints and achieves
a competitive ratio of O(log(QTTF )). ⋄
(See the proof in Appendix F.)
Remark: It is important to highlight that for the lemmas and theorem of
this section we only assume that Qn(Pj) ≥ 1, but the precise definition given
in (3.2), which depends on the assumptions about the physical layer, is only
used in the following sections.
3.5 Optimality
Now we will prove that no other algorithm can achieve a better competitive
ratio than the ACR algorithm in an asymptotic sense and that assumption
(3.6) is a necessary condition to achieve a good competitive ratio. To do
that, we will first show that even if flow rates are small enough, the profit of
the optimal off-line algorithm will exceed the profit of any on-line algorithm
that is oblivious to the future by a factor of Ω(log(QTTF )). Finally, we
will present stronger bounds for the case when flow rates are allowed to be
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relatively large, showing that the competitive ratio degrades when we allow
large rates.
The techniques used here are again similar to the ones developed for wire-
line networks in [33], but rely on the unique characteristics of wireless net-
works, especially to find worst case scenarios in Lemmas 7 and 10.
Lemma 7. Any on-line algorithm has a competitive ratio of Ω(logQT ). ⋄
(See the proof in Appendix G.)
Lemma 8. Any on-line algorithm has a competitive ratio of Ω(log T ). ⋄
(See the proof in Appendix H.)
Lemma 9. Any on-line algorithm has a competitive ratio of Ω(logF ). ⋄
(See the proof in Appendix I.)
Hence, we have just proved the following.
Theorem 5. Any on-line algorithm has competitive ratio of Ω(log(QTTF )).⋄
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Lemmas 7, 8 and 9.
For the proof of Theorem 5 we assume that (3.6) holds. We will now
proceed to prove that if this bound does not hold then no on-line algorithm
can achieve logarithmic competitive ratio.
Lemma 10. If we allow requests of rate up to 1
4k
then the competitive ratio
is Ω(Q
1
4k
T ) for any positive integer k. ⋄
(See the proof in Appendix J.)
Lemma 11. If we allow requests of rate up to 1
k
then the competitive ratio
is Ω(T
1
k ) for any positive integer k. ⋄
(See the proof in Appendix K.)
Lemma 12. If we allow requests of rate up to 1
k
then the competitive ratio
is Ω(F
1
k ) for any positive integer k. ⋄
(See the proof in Appendix L.)
Therefore, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 6. If we allow requests of rate up to 1
4k
then the competitive ratio
is Ω(Q
1
4k
T + T
1
4k + F
1
4k ) for any positive integer k. ⋄
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 10, 11 and 12.
Thus, in order to achieve logarithmic competitive ratio we need to let k be
greater than
log(QTTF )
4 log(log(QTTF ))
.
3.6 Distributed Implementation
In its present form, checking
∑
n∈N
∑
tSj ≤t<t
F
j
Qn(Pj)
rj(t)
u(n)
cn(t) ≤ ρj
in the ACR algorithm requires first specifying a path Pj from source to
destination, and then its associated cost can be calculated. Since we ideally
would like to use the minimum cost path, this means that it would be required
to first identify all possible paths and then find the cost for each one.
The contribution of this section is to show how this can be implemented
using a distributed algorithm that can find the minimum cost path without
first identifying all possible solutions, and where every node only needs to
get access to information from a local neighborhood.
Define the directed graph G = (N , E), where N is the set of nodes in the
wireless network and E is the set of all directed transmission edges. Formally,
e ∈ E if and only if e = (s(e), d(e)), where s(e), d(e) ∈ N , s(e) 6= d(e), and
node s(e) can transmit to node d(e).
Furthermore, define can(j) to be the aggregate cost that node n ∈ N has
during the holding time of flow request fj ∈ F . That is,
can(j) =
∑
tSj ≤t<t
F
j
rj(t)
u(n)
cn(t).
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With these definitions we have the following:
∑
n∈N
∑
tSj ≤t<t
F
j
Qn(Pj)
rj(t)
u(n)
cn(t) =
∑
n∈N
Qn(Pj)c
a
n(j)
(3.2)
=
∑
n∈N
∑
n′∈Nn
I{n′∈Pj}c
a
n(j)
[
I{n′ 6=dj} + I{n′∈HTn(Pj)}
]
=
∑
e∈Pj
∑
n∈Ns(e)
⋃
Nd(e)
can(j) (3.14)
=
∑
e∈Pj
Ce(j),
where (3.14) is simply summation reordering and
Ce(j) =
∑
n∈Ns(e)
⋃
Nd(e)
can(j) (3.15)
is the cost of using edge e for routing flow fj. It must be noted that (3.15)
decouples the cost of an edge from the path cost, allowing a distributed
implementation of a shortest path algorithm to find the optimal route. Fur-
thermore, for every edge e ∈ E we only need to gather information from the
local set Ns(e)
⋃
Nd(e) to find Ce(j). It must be noted that for any admis-
sion algorithm this is the minimal information that must be gathered and
updated in order to check resource availability, since the transmission in this
link will affect the load of all nodes in the set Ns(e)
⋃
Nd(e).
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMAL SCHEDULING FOR FAIR
RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN AD HOC
NETWORKS WITH ELASTIC AND
INELASTIC TRAFFIC
As wireless networks become more prevalent, they will be expected to support
a wide variety of services, including best-effort and real-time traffic. Such
networks will have to serve flows that require quality of service requirements,
such as minimum bandwidth and maximum delay constraints, while at the
same time keeping the network queues stable for data traffic and guaranteeing
throughput optimality. For the case of wireless networks with best-effort
traffic only, optimization-based algorithms which naturally map into different
layers of the protocol stack have been proposed in the last few years [53–58];
see [59] for a survey. However, these models do not take into account strict
per-packet delay bounds.
Scheduling packets with strict deadlines has been studied in [60–63], but
all of these papers provide approximate solutions. The model that we study
in this paper builds upon the recent work in [2,3,64] on admission control and
scheduling for inelastic flows in collocated wireless networks, i.e., networks
where all links interfere with each other. Among the many contributions in
these papers is a key modeling innovation whereby the network is studied
in frames, where a frame is a contiguous set of time-slots of fixed duration.
Packets with deadlines are assumed to arrive at the beginning of a frame and
have to be served by the end of the frame. In this chapter, we explore this
modeling paradigm further to study the design of resource allocation algo-
rithms for ad hoc networks. The frame-based model allows us to incorporate
delay deadlines in the optimization framework for very general network mod-
els, and somewhat surprisingly, allows us to design a common framework for
handling both elastic and inelastic flows.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
1. We present an optimization framework for resource allocation in a wire-
less network consisting of both best-effort flows and flows that generate
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traffic with per-packet delay constraints. The framework allows for very
general interference, channel and arrival models.
2. Using a dual decomposition approach, we derive an optimal schedul-
ing and congestion control algorithm that fairly allocates resources and
ensures that a required fraction of each inelastic flow’s packets are deliv-
ered on time by appealing to connections between Lagrange multipliers,
queues, and service deficits. The scheduling algorithm seamlessly inte-
grates inelastic and elastic traffic into an unified max-weight scheduling
framework, extending the well-known results in [1].
3. The convergence of the above algorithm in an appropriate stochastic
sense is proved and it is also shown that the network is stable.
4. We prove that the use of per-slot feedback does not increase the ca-
pacity region for stationary policies, but it can potentially simplify the
optimal scheduling algorithm.
4.1 Network Model
The network is represented by a directed graph G = (N ,L), where N is the
set of nodes and L is the set of directional links such that for all n1, n2 ∈ N if
(n1, n2) ∈ L then node n1 can transmit to node n2. The links are numbered
1 through |L|, and by abusing notation, we sometimes use l ∈ L to mean
l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |L|}.
Traffic is assumed to be a mixture of elastic and inelastic flows, where an
inelastic flow is one that has maximum per-packet delay requirements. In
contrast, elastic flows do not have such requirements.
Time is divided in slots, where a set of T consecutive time slots makes
a frame. We assume that packet arrivals only occur at the beginning of a
frame, and every inelastic packet has a deadline of T time slots. If a packet
misses its deadline it is discarded, and it is required that the loss probability
at link l ∈ L due to deadline expiry must be no more than pl. For elastic
traffic we associate a utility function Ul(xl) which is a function of the mean
elastic arrival rate per frame xl. We assume that Ul(.) is a concave function.
For a given frame, we denote by the vector ai = (ail)l∈L the number of
inelastic packet arrivals at every link, where ail is a random variable with
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mean λl and variance σ
2
il. We further assume that arrivals are independent
between different frames and that Pr(ail = 0) > 0 and Pr(ail = 1) > 0.
The last two assumptions are used to guarantee that the Markov chain we
define later is both irreducible and aperiodic, although these can be replaced
by other similar assumptions. Similarly, we define ae = (ael)l∈L to be the
number of elastic packet arrivals at every link in a given frame.
The channel state is assumed to be independent between different frames,
and independent of arrivals. This paper studies two cases: first, it is assumed
that the channel state is fixed for any given frame; second, the channel state
is allowed to change from time slot to time slot. In the fixed channel case,
the vector c = (cl)l∈L denotes the number of packets link l can successfully
transmit on a time slot in a given frame. In the case of the channel state
changing every time slot, the matrix c = (cl,t) denotes the number of packets
link l ∈ L can successfully transmit on time slot t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} for a given
frame.
Depending on the wireless technology used, we can have some channel
feedback before or after a transmission occurs. If channel estimation is per-
formed before transmitting, we can determine the optimal rate at which we
can successfully transmit. Alternatively, feedback from the receiver after the
transmission can be used to detect if a transmission is successful or not. In
this paper we try to capture the different scenarios in the following cases:
1. Known channel state: It is assumed that cl is a non-negative random
variable with mean c¯l and variance σ
2
cl, and we get to know the channel
state at the beginning of the frame.
2. Unknown channel state, per-frame feedback: It is assumed that cl is a
Bernoulli random variable with mean c¯l and we only get to know the
channel state at the end of the frame.
3. Unknown channel state, per-slot feedback: It is assumed that cl,t is a
Bernoulli random variable with mean c¯l and we get to know the channel
state at the end of the time slot.
In the known channel state case where we do channel estimation to deter-
mine the optimal transmission rate, we can potentially send more than one
packet in a time slot at higher rates. This is captured by the fact that we
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make no assumptions on the values cl can take since it will be determined
by the particular wireless technology used. In the case of unknown channel
state we assume that we only get the binary feedback of acknowledgments,
which is reflected in the Bernoulli assumption on cl and cl,t. In this case, and
without any loss of generality, we assume only one packet can be transmitted
per time slot per link.
4.2 Known Channel State
4.2.1 Problem Formulation
We first formulate the problem as a static optimization problem. Using
decomposition theory, we will then obtain a dynamic solution to this problem
and prove its stability using stochastic Lyapunov techniques.
A feasible schedule s = (sil,t, sel,t) is such that sil,t, sel,t respectively denote
the number of inelastic and elastic packets that can be scheduled for trans-
mission at link l ∈ L and time slot t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}; thus, sil,t + sel,t > 0
means that link l is scheduled to transmit in time slot t of the frame. Fur-
thermore, for any t, if sil1,t + sel1,t > 0 and sil2,t + sel2,t > 0 then links l1 and
l2 can be scheduled to simultaneously transmit without interfering with each
other. Assuming the inelastic arrivals and the channel state are given by ai
and c respectively, we have the following constraints:
T∑
t=1
sil,t ≤ ail for all l ∈ L and (4.1)
sil,t + sel,t ≤ cl for all l ∈ L and t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. (4.2)
We denote by S(ai, c) the set of all feasible schedules when the arrival state
is ai and the channel state is c; thus, S(ai, c) captures any interference con-
straints we have on our network and satisfies (4.1) and (4.2).
At the beginning of any frame we must choose a feasible schedule to serve
all links and decide how many elastic packets are allowed to be injected in
the network. Therefore, our goal is to find a function Pr(s|ai, c) which is
the probability of using schedule s ∈ S(ai, c) when the inelastic arrivals are
given by ai and the channel state is c, subject to the constraint that the loss
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probability at link l ∈ L due to deadline expiry cannot exceed pl. For elastic
traffic, we want to select the vector ae such that we maximize the network
utility while keeping the queues stable.
To properly formulate the problem, let us first define µi(ai, c) to be the
expected number of inelastic packets served if the number of packet arrivals
is given by ai and the channel state is c. Similarly, µe(ai, c) denotes the
expected number of elastic packets that can be served. Therefore, we have
the following constraints:
µil(ai, c) ≤
∑
s∈S(ai,c)
T∑
t=1
sil,tPr(s|ai, c)
µel(ai, c) ≤
∑
s∈S(ai,c)
T∑
t=1
sel,tPr(s|ai, c).
The expected service for mixed traffic at link l is then given by
µil
def
=
∑
ai
∑
c
µil(ai, c)Pr(c)Pr(ai)
µel
def
=
∑
ai
∑
c
µel(ai, c)Pr(c)Pr(ai)
and due to QoS requirements and capacity constraints, we require that
µil ≥ λl(1− pl) and xl ≤ µel.
We will focus on maximizing the following objective for some given vector
w ∈ R|L|+ :
max
µi(ai,c),µe(ai,c),
µi,µe,x,Pr(s|ai,c)
∑
l∈L
Ul(xl) + wlµil (4.3)
subject to
µil(ai, c) ≤
∑
s
T∑
t=1
sil,tPr(s|ai, c) for all l ∈ L, ai, c
µel(ai, c) ≤
∑
s
T∑
t=1
sel,tPr(s|ai, c) for all l ∈ L, ai, c
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µil =
∑
ai
∑
c
µil(ai, c)Pr(c)Pr(ai) for all l ∈ L
µel =
∑
ai
∑
c
µel(ai, c)Pr(c)Pr(ai) for all l ∈ L
µil ≥ λl(1− pl) for all l ∈ L
0 ≤ xl ≤ µel for all l ∈ L
Pr(s|ai, c) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S(ai, c), ai, c∑
s
Pr(s|ai, c) ≤ 1 for all ai, c.
The vector w can be used to allocate additional bandwidth fairly to inelas-
tic flows beyond what is required to meet their QoS needs. Other uses for
w will be explored in the simulations section. We will assume that the ar-
rivals and loss probability requirements are feasible and thus the optimization
problem has a solution (x∗, µ∗i ).
4.2.2 Solution Using Dual Decomposition
Using the definition of the dual function [65], we have that D(δi, δe) =
max
µi(ai,c),µe(ai,c),
µi,µe,x,Pr(s|ai,c)
∑
l∈L
Ul(xl) + wlµil − δel[xl − µel]− δil[λl(1− pl)− µil]
subject to
µil(ai, c) ≤
∑
s
T∑
t=1
sil,tPr(s|ai, c) for all l ∈ L, ai, c
µel(ai, c) ≤
∑
s
T∑
t=1
sel,tPr(s|ai, c) for all l ∈ L, ai, c
µil =
∑
ai
∑
c
µil(ai, c)Pr(c)Pr(ai) for all l ∈ L
µel =
∑
ai
∑
c
µel(ai, c)Pr(c)Pr(ai) for all l ∈ L
xl ≥ 0 for all l ∈ L
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Pr(s|ai, c) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S(ai, c), ai, c∑
s
Pr(s|ai, c) ≤ 1 for all ai, c.
Slater’s condition [66] states that, since the objective is concave and the
constraints are affine functions, the duality gap is zero and thereforeD(δ∗i , δ
∗
e) =∑
l∈L
Ul(x
∗
l ) + wlµ
∗
il, where
(δ∗i , δ
∗
e) ∈ argmin
δil≥0,δel≥0
D(δi, δe).
We are interested in finding (x∗, µ∗i ) but not the value D(δ
∗
i , δ
∗
e), so if we
rewrite the objective in the dual function as
max
µi(ai,c),µe(ai,c),
µi,µe,x,Pr(s|ai,c)


∑
l∈L
Ul(xl)− δelxl
+
∑
l∈L
(wl + δil)µil + δelµel
−
∑
l∈L
δilλl(1− pl)


we notice that the problem can be decomposed into the following subprob-
lems:
max
xl≥0
Ul(xl)− δelxl
and
max
µi(ai,c),µe(ai,c),
µi,µe,P r(s|ai,c)
∑
l∈L
(wl + δil)µil + δelµel (4.4)
subject to
µil(ai, c) ≤
∑
s
T∑
t=1
sil,tPr(s|ai, c) for all l ∈ L, ai, c
µel(ai, c) ≤
∑
s
T∑
t=1
sel,tPr(s|ai, c) for all l ∈ L, ai, c
µil =
∑
ai
∑
c
µil(ai, c)Pr(c)Pr(ai) for all l ∈ L
µel =
∑
ai
∑
c
µel(ai, c)Pr(c)Pr(ai) for all l ∈ L
Pr(s|ai, c) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S(ai, c), ai, c
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∑
s
Pr(s|ai, c) ≤ 1 for all ai, c.
Furthermore, since we are interested in solving the problem for non-negative
values of δil and δel, it must be the case that µ
∗
i and µ
∗
e are as large as
possible, and since the upper bounds for µ∗il(ai, c) and µ
∗
el(ai, c) are expressed
as a convex combination, and the objective function in (4.4) is linear, the
problem can be decomposed into the following subproblems for fixed ai and
c:
max
s∈S(ai,c)
∑
l∈L
[
(wl + δil)
T∑
t=1
sil,t + δel
T∑
t=1
sel,t
]
.
This suggests the following iterative algorithm to find the solution to our
optimization problem, where k is the step index and Xmax > maxl∈L x
∗
l is a
fixed parameter:
x˜∗l (k) ∈ argmax
0≤xl≤Xmax
Ul(xl)− δel(k)xl
s˜∗(ai, c, k) ∈
argmax
s∈S(ai,c)
∑
l∈L
{
[wl + δil(k)]
T∑
t=1
sil,t + δel(k)
T∑
t=1
sel,t
}
µ˜∗il(k) =
∑
ai
∑
c
T∑
t=1
s˜∗il,t(ai, c, k)Pr(c)Pr(ai)
µ˜∗el(k) =
∑
ai
∑
c
T∑
t=1
s˜∗el,t(ai, c, k)Pr(c)Pr(ai).
We update the Lagrange multipliers δi(k), δe(k) at every step according to
the following equations:
δil(k + 1) = {δil(k) + ǫ[λl(1− pl)− µ˜
∗
il(k)]}
+
and
δel(k + 1) = {δel(k) + ǫ[x˜
∗
l (k)− µ˜
∗
el(k)]}
+
where ǫ > 0 is a fixed step-size parameter, and for any α ∈ R, α+
def
=
max{α, 0}.
Making the change of variables ǫdˆ(k) = δi(k) and ǫqˆ(k) = δe(k), we have
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that our iterative algorithm can be rewritten as
x˜∗l (k) ∈ argmax
0≤xl≤Xmax
1
ǫ
Ul(xl)− qˆl(k)xl
s˜∗(ai, c, k) ∈
argmax
s∈S(ai,c)
∑
l∈L
{[
1
ǫ
wl + dˆl(k)
] T∑
t=1
sil,t + qˆl(k)
T∑
t=1
sel,t
}
µ˜∗il(k) =
∑
ai
∑
c
T∑
t=1
s˜∗il,t(ai, c, k)Pr(c)Pr(ai)
µ˜∗el(k) =
∑
ai
∑
c
T∑
t=1
s˜∗el,t(ai, c, k)Pr(c)Pr(ai)
with update equations
dˆl(k + 1) = [dˆl(k) + λl(1− pl)− µ˜
∗
il(k)]
+
qˆl(k + 1) = [qˆl(k) + x˜
∗
l (k)− µ˜
∗
el(k)]
+.
It should be noted that due to the change of variables dˆl(k) can be inter-
preted as a queue that has λl(1 − pl) arrivals and µ˜
∗
il(k) departures at step
k; qˆl(k) can have a similar queue interpretation. The dual decomposition
approach only provides an intuition behind the solution but the real net-
work has stochastic and dynamic arrivals and channel state conditions. In
the next section, we present the complete solution which takes into account
these dynamics and also establishes its convergence properties.
4.2.3 Dynamic Algorithm and Its Convergence Analysis
Scheduler and Congestion Controller
To implement the algorithm on-line, we propose the following congestion
control algorithm in frame k, where the queue length at link l is given by
ql(k):
x˜∗l (k) ∈ argmax
0≤xl≤Xmax
1
ǫ
Ul(xl)− ql(k)xl. (4.5)
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We need to convert this elastic arrival rate, which in general is a non-
negative real number, into a non-negative integer indicating the number of
elastic packets allowed to enter the network in a given frame. This conversion
can be made in many different ways: we assume the elastic arrivals at link l,
a˜el(k), are a random variable with mean x˜
∗
l (k) and variance upper-bounded
by σ2e , and are such that Pr(a˜el(k) = 0) > 0 and Pr(a˜el(k) = 1) > 0 for all
l ∈ L and all k. The last two assumptions are used to guarantee the Markov
chain we define below is both irreducible and aperiodic, although these can
be replaced by other similar assumptions.
Letting the number of inelastic arrivals be denoted by ai(k) and the channel
state by c(k), we propose the following scheduling algorithm:
s˜∗(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k)) ∈ (4.6)
argmax
s∈S(ai(k),c(k))
∑
l∈L
{[
1
ǫ
wl + dl(k)
] T∑
t=1
sil,t + ql(k)
T∑
t=1
sel,t
}
.
The vectors d(k) and q(k) are updated from frame to frame as follows:
dl(k + 1) = [dl(k) + a˜il(k)− I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))]
+
ql(k + 1) = [ql(k) + a˜el(k)− I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))]
+,
where
I∗il(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k)) =
T∑
t=1
s˜∗il,t(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))
I∗el(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k)) =
T∑
t=1
s˜∗el,t(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))
and a˜il(k) is a binomial random variable with parameters ail(k) and 1 − pl.
The quantity a˜il(k) can be generated by the network as follows: upon each
inelastic packet arrival, toss a coin with probability of heads equal to 1− pl,
and if the outcome is heads, add a one to the deficit counter.
In our notation we make explicit the fact that for fixed ǫ and w, the optimal
scheduler (4.6) is a function of ai(k), c(k), d(k), and q(k). We interpret dl(k)
as a virtual queue that counts the deficit in service for link l to achieve a loss
probability due to deadline expiry less than or equal to pl. This deficit queue
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was first used in the inelastic traffic context in [2] for the case of collocated
networks; the connection to the dual decomposition approach now provides
a Lagrange multiplier interpretation to it and allows the extension to general
ad hoc networks. Note that ql(k) is just the queue size for elastic packets at
link l.
Convergence Results
For ease of readability, we present the main results in this section, but the
proofs are deferred to the appendixes. We start by noting that (d(k), q(k))
defines an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain. To prove that our dy-
namic algorithm achieves the optimal solution to the static problem (4.3) in
some average sense and fulfills all links’ requirements, we will first bound the
expected drift of (d(k), q(k)) for a suitable Lyapunov function.
Lemma 13. Consider the Lyapunov function V (d, q) = 1
2
∑
l∈L d
2
l + q
2
l . If
µ∗il > λl(1− pl) and µ
∗
el > x
∗
l for all l ∈ L, then
E [V (d(k + 1), q(k + 1))|d(k) = d, q(k) = q]− V (d, q)
≤B1 −B2
∑
l∈L
dl −B3
∑
l∈L
ql −
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
[Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))]
−
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
wlµ
∗
il − wlE [I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
for some positive constants B1, B2, B3, any ǫ > 0, where (x
∗, µ∗i ) is the
solution to (4.3), x˜∗(k) is the solution to (4.5), and I∗i (ai(k), c(k), d, q) is
obtained from the solution to (4.6). ⋄
It is important to note that since the last two terms in the right-hand side
of the inequality can be upper-bounded, Lemma 13 implies that (d(k), q(k))
is positive recurrent since the expected drift is negative but for a finite set of
values of (d(k), q(k)). As a direct consequence of this fact, we note that the
total service deficit and queue length have a O(1/ǫ) bound.
Corollary 2. If µ∗il > λl(1 − pl) and µ
∗
el > x
∗
l for all l ∈ L, then the total
expected service deficit and network queue length is upper-bounded by
lim sup
k→∞
E
[∑
l∈L
dl(k) + ql(k)
]
≤ B4 +
1
ǫ
B5
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for all l ∈ L and
B4 =
B1
min{B2, B3}
and
B5 ≤
∑
l∈Lmax0≤xl≤Xmax 2|Ul(xl)|+ wlλl
min{B2, B3}
.
⋄
This also implies that the scheduling and congestion control algorithm
fulfills all links’ inelastic requirements.
Corollary 3. If µ∗il > λl(1− pl) and µ
∗
el > x
∗
l for all l ∈ L, then the on-line
algorithm fulfills all the inelastic constraints. That is:
lim inf
K→∞
E
[
1
K
K∑
k=1
I∗il(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))
]
≥ λl(1− pl)
for all l ∈ L. ⋄
The above corollary simply states that the arrival rate into the deficit
counter is less than or equal to the departure rate. This result is an obvious
consequence of the stability of the deficit counters and so a formal proof is
not provided here.
Now we are ready to prove that our on-line algorithm is within O(ǫ) of the
optimal value.
Theorem 7. For any ǫ > 0, if µ∗il > λl(1 − pl) and µ
∗
el > x
∗
l for all l ∈ L,
then
lim sup
K→∞
E
[∑
l∈L
Ul(x
∗
l ) + wlµ
∗
il −
∑
l∈L
1
K
K∑
k=1
Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))
−
∑
l∈L
1
K
K∑
k=1
wlI
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))
]
≤ Bǫ
for some B > 0, where (x∗, µ∗i ) is the solution to (4.3), x˜
∗(k) is the solution
to (4.5), and I∗i (ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k)) is obtained from the solution to (4.6).
⋄
In conclusion, there is a trade-off in choosing the parameter ǫ: smaller
values will achieve a solution closer to the optimal, but at the same time the
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deficit in service at the links and the aggregate queue length increase. The
statement and the proof of Theorem 7 follows the techniques in [55]. The
result can also be derived, in a slightly different form, using the techniques
in [56]. A closely related result can be obtained using the methods in [53].
4.3 Unknown Channel State, Per-Frame Feedback
The analysis for the unknown channel case is similar to the one we presented
for the known channel case, so in this section we will only highlight the
differences.
A feasible schedule s = (sil,t, sel,t) is such that sil,t, sel,t respectively de-
note the number of inelastic and elastic packets that can be scheduled for
transmission at link l ∈ L and time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} without violating any
interference constraints. Assuming the inelastic arrivals are given by ai, and
since we can only schedule at most one packet per link at every time slot, we
have the following constraints:
T∑
t=1
sil,t ≤ ail for all l ∈ L and (4.7)
sil,t + sel,t ≤ 1 for all l ∈ L and t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. (4.8)
We denote by S(ai) the set of all feasible schedules for fixed arrivals, capturing
any interference constraints we have on our network, and satisfying (4.7) and
(4.8).
Our goal now is to find a function Pr(s|ai) which is the probability of
using schedule s ∈ S(ai) when the inelastic arrivals are given by ai, subject
to the constraint that the loss probability at link l ∈ L due to deadline expiry
cannot exceed pl. For elastic traffic, we still want to select the vector ae such
that we maximize the total utility while keeping the queues stable.
For a given distribution Pr(s|ai) we have that µil(ai) is the expected num-
ber of attempted inelastic transmissions if arrivals are given by ai. Similarly,
µel(ai) denotes the expected number of times link l is scheduled to serve elas-
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tic packets in a given frame. As before, we have the following constraints:
µil(ai) ≤
∑
s
T∑
t=1
sil,tPr(s|ai)
µel(ai) ≤
∑
s
T∑
t=1
sel,tPr(s|ai)
When the (unknown) channel state is c, we have that clµil(ai) is the ex-
pected number of successful inelastic transmissions per frame at link l for
fixed arrivals, while clµel(ai) is the expected service to link l for inelastic
arrivals. Thus, the expected service for mixed traffic at link l is given by
µil
def
=
∑
ai
∑
c
clµil(ai)Pr(c)Pr(ai)
µel
def
=
∑
ai
∑
c
clµel(ai)Pr(c)Pr(ai).
Simplifying both expressions we get
µil =
∑
ai
c¯lµil(ai)Pr(ai)
µel =
∑
ai
c¯lµel(ai)Pr(ai).
Due to service requirements and capacity constraints we need that
µil ≥ λl(1− pl) and xl ≤ µel.
With the definitions and constraints stated above we can formulate the
optimization problem in a similar way as in (4.3).
The only difference with the known channel state case is the scheduling
algorithm. Assuming inelastic arrivals are given by ai(k) the scheduling
algorithm is given by
s˜∗(ai(k), d(k), q(k)) ∈
argmax
s∈S(ai(k))
∑
l∈L
{[
1
ǫ
wl + dl(k)
]
c¯l
T∑
t=1
sil,t + ql(k)c¯l
T∑
t=1
sel,t
}
.
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The main difference in the scheduling algorithm compared to the known
channel state case is that the network now uses the expected channel state in
making scheduling decisions. Thus, the network needs to know or estimate
c¯l as in [2].
Similar results can be proved for this algorithm using the techniques de-
veloped in Section 4.2.3, whereby one can show that the algorithm meets
all the inelastic QoS constraints, the total expected service deficits and the
queue lengths have a O(1/ǫ) bound, and the mean value of the objective is
within O(ǫ) of the optimal value.
4.4 Unknown Channel State, Per-Slot Feedback
4.4.1 Problem Formulation
In this section we assume that there is only inelastic traffic and that at every
frame and at every link there is one packet arrival. This simplification in the
problem formulation allows us to develop the main ideas behind this case,
while the generalization to more complex scenarios is similar in nature to the
development done in previous sections.
We first formulate the problem as a static optimization problem. Using
decomposition theory, we will then obtain a dynamic solution that makes
per-frame decisions and prove its stability using stochastic Lyapunov tech-
niques. Later we will prove that feedback at every slot does not improve the
capacity region compared to the utility maximization framework, but it can
help simplify the scheduling algorithm in certain scenarios.
A feasible schedule s = (sl,t) denotes the number of inelastic packets that
can be scheduled for transmission at link l ∈ L and time slot t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T};
thus, sl,t > 0 means that link l is scheduled to transmit in time slot t of the
frame. Furthermore, for any t, if sl1,t > 0 and sl2,t > 0 then links l1 and l2
can be scheduled simultaneously to transmit without interfering with each
other. Since we assume we can only schedule at most one packet per link at
every time slot, we have the following constraint:
sl,t ≤ 1 for all l ∈ L and t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. (4.9)
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We denote by S the set of all feasible schedules, capturing any interference
constraints we have on our network, and satisfying (4.9).
At the beginning of any frame we must choose a feasible schedule to serve
all links. Therefore, our goal is to find a function Pr(s) which is the probabil-
ity of using schedule s ∈ S, subject to the constraint that the loss probability
at link l ∈ L due to deadline expiry cannot exceed pl.
To properly formulate the problem, define τ = (τl,s) to be the number of
slots assigned to link l ∈ L under schedule s ∈ S. That is,
τl,s =
T∑
t=1
sl,t.
Denoting by µ = (µl)l∈L the expected service to link l, we have that
µl ≤
∑
s∈S
[1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ]Pr(s).
Due to QoS requirements, we require that
µl ≥ (1− pl).
We will focus on maximizing the following objective for some given con-
stant A:
max
τ,µ,Pr(s)
A (4.10)
subject to
τl,s =
T∑
t=1
sl,t for all l ∈ L and s ∈ S
µl ≤
∑
s∈S
[1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ]Pr(s) for all l ∈ L
µl ≥ (1− pl) for all l ∈ L
Pr(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S∑
s∈S
Pr(s) ≤ 1.
The objective in the above optimization formulation is a dummy objec-
tive; the real goal is to find a feasible resource allocation without any further
considerations. We will assume that the arrivals and loss probability require-
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ments are feasible and thus the optimization problem has a solution µ∗.
4.4.2 Solution Using Dual Decomposition
Using the definition of the dual function [65], we have that D(δ) =
max
τ,µ,Pr(s)
A−
∑
l∈L
δl[(1− pl)− µl]
subject to
τl,s =
T∑
t=1
sl,t for all l ∈ L and s ∈ S
µl ≤
∑
s∈S
[1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ]Pr(s) for all l ∈ L
Pr(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S∑
s∈S
Pr(s) ≤ 1.
We are interested in finding µ∗ but not the value D(δ∗), so if we rewrite
the objective in the dual function as
max
τ,µ,Pr(s)
A−
∑
l∈L
δl(1− pl) +
∑
l∈L
δlµl
we note that the problem can be simplified to
max
τ,µ,Pr(s)
∑
l∈L
δlµl (4.11)
subject to
τl,s =
T∑
t=1
sl,t for all l ∈ L and s ∈ S
µl ≤
∑
s∈S
[1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ]Pr(s) for all l ∈ L
Pr(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S∑
s∈S
Pr(s) ≤ 1.
Since we are interested in solving this problem for non-negative values of δl,
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it must be the case that µ∗l is as large as the constraints allow. Furthermore,
since the upper bound for µl is expressed as a convex combination, and the
objective function in (4.11) is linear, the problem can be further simplified
to
max
s∈S
∑
l∈L
δl [1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ] ,
where
τl,s =
T∑
t=1
sl,t for all l ∈ L and s ∈ S.
This suggests the following iterative algorithm to find the solution to our
optimization problem, where k is the step index:
s˜∗(k) ∈ argmax
s∈S
∑
l∈L
δl(k) [1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ] .
We update the Lagrange multipliers δl(k) at every step according to the
following equation:
δl(k + 1) = {δl(k) + ǫ[(1− pl)− µ˜
∗
l (k)]}
+
where
µ˜∗l (k) =
[
1− (1− c¯l)
τ˜∗l,s(k)
]
,
τ˜ ∗l,s(k) =
T∑
t=1
s˜∗l,t(k) for all l ∈ L,
ǫ > 0 is a fixed step-size parameter, and for any α ∈ R, α+
def
= max{α, 0}.
Making the change of variables ǫdˆ(k) = δ(k), we have that our iterative
algorithm can be rewritten as
s˜∗(k) ∈ argmax
s∈S
∑
l∈L
dˆl(k) [1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ]
with update equations
dˆl(k + 1) = [dˆl(k) + (1− pl)− µ˜
∗
l (k)]
+.
It should be noted that due to the change of variables dˆl(k) can be in-
terpreted as a queue that has (1− pl) arrivals and µ˜
∗
l (k) departures at step
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k. The dual decomposition approach only provides an intuition behind the
solution, but the real network has stochastic and dynamic arrivals and chan-
nel state conditions. In the next section, we present the complete solution
which takes into account these dynamics and we also establish its convergence
properties.
4.4.3 Dynamic Algorithm and Its Convergence Analysis
Scheduler and Congestion Controller
To implement the algorithm on-line, we propose the following scheduling
algorithm in frame k, where we denote the channel state by c(k):
s˜∗(d(k)) ∈ argmax
s∈S
∑
l∈L
dl(k) [1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ] (4.12)
where
τl,s =
T∑
t=1
sl,t for all l ∈ L and s ∈ S.
The vector d(k) is updated from frame to frame as follows:
dl(k + 1) = [dl(k) + a˜l(k)− I
∗
l (c(k), d(k))]
+
where
I∗l (c(k), d(k)) = min
{
T∑
t=1
cl,t(k)s˜
∗
l,t(d(k)), 1
}
,
and a˜l(k) is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter 1−pl. The quantity
a˜l(k) can be generated by the network as follows: upon each packet arrival,
toss a coin with probability of heads equal to 1 − pl, and if the outcome is
heads, add a one to the deficit counter.
In our notation we make explicit the fact that the optimal scheduler (4.12)
is a function of d(k). We interpret dl(k) as a virtual queue that counts the
deficit in service for link l to achieve a loss probability due to deadline expiry
less than or equal to pl. This deficit queue was first used in the inelastic traffic
context in [2] for the case of collocated networks; the connection to the dual
decomposition approach now provides a Lagrange multiplier interpretation
to it and allows the extension to general ad hoc networks.
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Convergence Results
For readability, we present the main results in this section, but the proof of
Lemma 14 is deferred to Appendix O. We start by noting that d(k) defines
an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain. To prove that our dynamic al-
gorithm makes the deficit counters stable and fulfills all links’ requirements,
we first bound the expected drift of d(k) for a suitable Lyapunov function.
Lemma 14. Consider the Lyapunov function V (d) = 1
2
∑
l∈L d
2
l . If µ
∗
l >
(1− pl) for all l ∈ L, then
E [V (d(k + 1))|d(k) = d]− V (d) ≤ B1 −B2
∑
l∈L
dl
for some positive constants B1, B2. ⋄
It is important to note that Lemma 14 implies that d(k) is positive recur-
rent since the expected drift is negative but for a finite set of values of d(k).
As a direct consequence of this fact, we note that the total service deficit is
upper-bounded.
Corollary 4. If µ∗l > (1 − pl) for all l ∈ L then the total expected service
deficit is upper-bounded by
lim sup
k→∞
E
[∑
l∈L
dl(k)
]
≤ B3
for all l ∈ L and
B3 =
B1
B2
.
⋄
This also implies that the scheduling algorithm fulfills all links’ inelastic
requirements.
Corollary 5. If µ∗l > (1−pl) for all l ∈ L, then the on-line algorithm fulfills
all the inelastic constraints. That is:
lim inf
K→∞
E
[
1
K
K∑
k=1
I∗l (c(k), d(k))
]
≥ (1− pl)
for all l ∈ L. ⋄
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The above corollary simply states that the arrival rate into the deficit
counter is less than or equal to the departure rate. This result is an obvious
consequence of the stability of the deficit counters and so a formal proof is
not provided here.
4.4.4 Per-Slot Feedback and the Capacity Region
So far we have developed a framework that allows us to choose a schedule at
the beginning of every frame and ignore any per-slot feedback we get, while
fulfilling all the inelastic constraints. It remains to be shown that we cannot
increase the capacity region of the network by using per-slot feedback in our
scheduling decisions. To prove that, we will restrict ourselves to the set of
stabilizing frame-stationary policies.
Definition 9. A stabilizing frame-stationary policy is a scheduling algorithm
with the following properties:
1. The policy makes scheduling decisions at every time slot based only on
the current value of the deficit counters, and on the success or failure
of its decisions at previous slots of the current frame. In particular, the
policy is not a function of events in previous frames.
2. The policy renders the deficit counters at frame boundaries stable. In
other words, the Markov chain d(k) is positive recurrent. ⋄
Theorem 8. Any stabilizing frame-stationary policy has a per-frame station-
ary distribution. ⋄
Proof. First, we highlight the fact that due to Property 2 in Definition 9,
we know that the Markov chain d(k) has a stationary distribution since it is
positive recurrent. Second, from Property 1 in Definition 9 we know that the
scheduling policy at time slot t in a given frame depends only on the history
of slots 1 through t − 1. That is, the scheduling decision at time slot t is
given by:
Pr
[
(sl,t)l∈L
∣∣∣d(k), (sl,j)j∈{1,...,t−1}l∈L , (cl,jsl,j)j∈{1,...,t−1}l∈L ] ,
where cl,jsl,j is an indicator that expresses the success or failure of the sched-
uling decisions.
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Since we assume that cl,t is a Bernoulli random variable, and since d(k) has
a stationary distribution, it is clear that we can explicitly write the per-frame
stationary distribution Pr(s) of any stabilizing frame-stationary policy.
From Theorem 8 we note that there is no loss of generality in our utility
maximization framework because the formulation already takes into account
the set of stabilizing frame-stationary policies, and therefore we cannot im-
prove the capacity region by allowing per-slot feedback to affect scheduling
decisions. However, we also note that the use of per-slot feedback can poten-
tially decrease the complexity of the scheduling algorithm as shown in [2].
4.4.5 A Greedy Strategy for Collocated Networks
To show how feedback can help simplify the on-line algorithm (4.12), in this
section we will prove that a strategy that makes greedy decisions at every
time slot suffices for networks where only one link can transmit at any given
time, thus recovering the results in [2] for access-point networks.
Fact 1. The expected service to link l depends not on which specific time
slots the link is scheduled, but on the total number of slots it is scheduled. ⋄
This implies that for a feasible schedule s with expected service given by
[1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ] at link l, we can generate another feasible schedule s˜ with the
same expected service at every link by doing a permutation in the time slot
index of s. For the case of collocated networks, Fact 1 allows us to restrict
our attention, without any loss of generality, to the set of feasible schedules
s such that ∑
l∈L
sl,t ≤ 1 for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}
where links can only be scheduled in decreasing order of the priorities dlc¯l,
given that the deficit counters at the beginning of the frame are given by d.
We denote by S(d) the set of feasible schedules with the defined priorities.
We first prove that the best one can do in time slot 1 is to schedule the
link with the highest priority. For ease of readability, we defer the proofs to
the appendixes.
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Lemma 15. If at a given frame the deficit counters are given by d, and if we
restrict the optimization (4.12) to the set S(d), then at time slot 1 we have
s˜∗l,1(d) =
{
1 for a l˜ ∈ L such that dl˜c¯l˜ ≥ dlc¯l for all l ∈ L
0 for l ∈ L \ {l˜}.
(4.13)
⋄
Definition 10. A greedy strategy for collocated networks is a scheduling
policy that at every time slot schedules the link with the highest priority dlc¯l
among the links that have a packet that remains to be transmitted. ⋄
This means that the greedy strategy makes its decisions based on the value
of the deficit counters and the channel state at the previous time slots. At
the end of the time frame, the greedy algorithm would have picked a schedule
that we denote by sg(c, d), when the deficit counters at the beginning of the
frame were given by d and the channel state in the frame was c.
We now show that using the greedy scheduler can only improve the total
weighted expected service compared to the on-line algorithm in (4.12).
Lemma 16. Assuming that the deficit counters at the beginning of the frame
k are given by d(k) = d, we have that
∑
l∈L
dlE
[
T∑
t=1
cl,ts
g
l,t(c, d)
∣∣∣∣∣d(k) = d
]
≥
∑
l∈L
dl
[
1− (1− c¯l)
τ∗l,s
]
where
τ ∗l,s =
T∑
t=1
s˜∗l,t(d),
and s˜∗(d) is the solution to (4.12). ⋄
This result allows us to bound the expected drift of the deficit counters for
a suitable Lyapunov function when the greedy strategy is used.
Lemma 17. Consider the Lyapunov function V (d) = 1
2
∑
l∈L d
2
l . If µ
∗
l >
(1− pl) for all l ∈ L, and the greedy strategy is used, we have
E [V (d(k + 1))|d(k) = d]− V (d) ≤ B1 −B2
∑
l∈L
dl
for some positive constants B1, B2. ⋄
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Similar to the development in Section 4.4.3, one can show that the greedy
algorithm meets all the inelastic QoS constraints and the total expected
service deficit is upper-bounded.
4.4.6 Probabilistic Arrivals and Fairness
In this section we extend the formulation of Section 4.4.1 for the case of
probabilistic arrivals and weighted throughput fairness to allocate bandwidth
to links beyond what is required to meet their QoS needs. Since the analysis
is similar to the one we already presented, we only highlight the differences.
We denote by the vector a = (al)l∈L the number of inelastic packet arrivals
at every link, where al is a random variable with mean λl and variance σ
2
l .
We assume that arrivals are independent between frames and independent
of the channel state and that Pr(al = 0) > 0 and Pr(al = 1) > 0. The last
two assumptions are used to guarantee that the Markov chain we define later
is both irreducible and aperiodic, although these can be replaced by other
similar assumptions.
Our goal is to find a function Pr(s|a) which is the probability of using
schedule s ∈ S when the inelastic arrivals are given by a, subject to the
constraint that the loss probability at link l ∈ L due to deadline expiry
cannot exceed pl.
The expected service at link l when the schedule is s ∈ S and the arrivals
at the frame are given by a is
µl(s, a) ≤
∑
c
min
{
T∑
t=1
cl,tsl,t, al
}
Pr(c).
Thus, the expected service at link l when using policy Pr(s|a) is
µl
def
=
∑
a
∑
s∈S
µl(s, a)Pr(s|a)Pr(a).
Due to service requirements and capacity constraints we need that
µl ≥ λl(1− pl).
We will focus on maximizing the following objective for some given vector
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w ∈ R|L|+ :
max
Pr(s|a),µ(s,a),µ
∑
l∈L
wlµl (4.14)
subject to
µl(s, a) ≤
∑
c
min
{
T∑
t=1
cl,tsl,t, al
}
Pr(c) for all l ∈ L, s ∈ S, a
µl =
∑
a
∑
s∈S
µl(s, a)Pr(s|a)Pr(a) for all l ∈ L
µl ≥ λl(1− pl) for all l ∈ L
Pr(s|a) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S, a∑
s∈S
Pr(s|a) ≤ 1 for all a.
We will assume that the arrivals and loss probability requirements are
feasible and thus the optimization problem has a solution µ∗.
With this formulation we can use a dual decomposition approach to find
the on-line scheduler. Assuming inelastic arrivals in frame k are given by
a(k) and the channel state is c(k), the algorithm is given by
s˜∗(a(k), d(k)) ∈ argmax
s∈S
∑
l∈L
[
1
ǫ
wl + dl(k)
]
µl(s, a(k)),
where
µl(s, a(k)) =
∑
c
min
{
T∑
t=1
cl,tsl,t, al(k)
}
Pr(c),
and the deficit counters d(k) have the following update equation:
dl(k + 1) = [dl(k) + a˜l(k)− I
∗
l (a(k), c(k), d(k))]
+,
where
I∗l (a(k), c(k), d(k)) = min
{
T∑
t=1
cl,t(k)s˜
∗
l,t(a(k), d(k)), al(k)
}
.
Similar results can be proved for this algorithm using the techniques devel-
oped in Section 4.2.3, whereby one can show that the algorithm meets all the
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Figure 4.1: Interference graph used in the simulations
inelastic QoS constraints, the total expected service deficits have a O(1/ǫ)
bound, and the mean value of the objective is within O(ǫ) of the optimal
value. Furthermore, Section 4.4.4 can be similarly modified to take into ac-
count probabilistic arrivals to prove equivalent results. Section 4.4.5 can be
modified to take into account probabilistic arrivals for the case when al is
a Bernoulli random variable, and when we do not use weighted throughput
fairness as our objective function.
4.5 Simulations
The purpose of this simulation study is to understand how the parameter
ǫ and the link weights wl impact the performance of the algorithm, and
how a greedy heuristic can be used to implement the optimal scheduler. We
simulate a 10-link network with an interference graph given by Fig. 4.1, where
each node represents a link and each edge means that the two adjacent links
cannot be scheduled simultaneously. For example, if link 1 is scheduled, then
links 2, 4, and 7 cannot be activated. The required loss probability due to
deadline expiry of inelastic packets is set to 0.1, the link arrivals are assumed
to have a Bernoulli distribution with mean 0.6 packets/frame, and there are
3 time slots per frame. The channel for every link is assumed to have a
Bernoulli distribution with mean 0.96, and we get to know the channel state
at the beginning of the frame. We set Ul(xl) = log(xl) for all links. The
simulation time was 106 frames.
As can be noted from (4.6), the max-weight scheduler requires that we do
an exhaustive search to find the optimal schedule at every frame. For large
networks this can become a burden due to the large search space; thus we
explore a greedy heuristic and check how close it is to the optimal solution:
at any given time slot, the greedy scheduler orders all links according to
their weights. The greedy scheduler adds one of the links with the largest
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Figure 4.2: Deficit size and queue length when wl = 0
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Figure 4.3: Deficit size and queue length when wl = 3
weight to the schedule, then removes all links that interfere with this link
from the graph, then schedules a link with the largest weight among the
remaining links, and so on. This procedure continues until no more links can
be scheduled.
In Figs. 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, we plot the expected values of the deficit counters
and queues per link for various values of wl, and compare their evolution for
both the scheduler with optimal decisions and the greedy scheduler.
We see that as wl increases, the deficit counters become small. The upper
bound in Corollary 2 only suggests that the sum of the deficit counters and
queues is O(1/ǫ). Thus, it is interesting to note that by changing wl, one can
nearly eliminate the backlog in deficit for inelastic traffic while maintaining
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Figure 4.4: Deficit size and queue length when wl = 6
the same order of queue sizes. The reason for this can be understood by
examining the scheduling algorithm (4.6). Note that the algorithm gives
priority to elastic traffic if queues are larger than counters. When wl is small
compared to ǫ, the effect of wl is negligible in the scheduling algorithm. On
the other hand, when wl is O(1), wl/ǫ is O(1/ǫ) which is comparable to the
queue lengths and hence, the deficit does not have to be large to provide
service to inelastic traffic under algorithm (4.6).
It must be noted that small deficit counters mean that there is a small
backlog in providing acceptable service to inelastic arrivals. For the case of
real-time traffic this is a desirable property, since we do not want to have
large variations in the service provided that could affect the perceived qual-
ity. Thus, even if fair allocation of bandwidth beyond the minimum is not
required for inelastic flows, choosing wl an order of magnitude larger than ǫ
is desirable to maintain small deficits.
As can be noted, the greedy scheduler seems to give lower deficit values
than the optimal scheduler for larger values of wl. We believe that the reason
is that weights given to inelastic flows increase with increasing wl and there-
fore the greedy scheduler picks them first. However, our optimality goal is
given by (4.3) which is determined by the rates received by the various flows.
The rates achieved by the two schedulers are quite close in the simulations,
as seen in Figs. 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7, while keeping the dropping probabilities
below the requirement, as shown in Figs. 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10.
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Figure 4.5: Average service when wl = 0
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Figure 4.6: Average service when wl = 3
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Figure 4.7: Average service when wl = 6
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Figure 4.8: Dropping probability when wl = 0
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Figure 4.9: Dropping probability when wl = 3
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Figure 4.10: Dropping probability when wl = 6
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation we have studied key design problems in wireless ad hoc
networks. We showed how reputation-based mechanisms can help coopera-
tion emerge among selfish users, studied the properties of previously proposed
schemes, and with the insight gained from such understanding, we proposed a
new mechanism called DARWIN, which is robust to imperfect measurements,
is collusion-resistant and is able to achieve full cooperation.
We developed a model for admission control and routing with minimum-
bandwidth requirements which allows us to derive an algorithm with provable
performance guarantees using competitive analysis. We proved that our al-
gorithm has a performance close to that of an omniscient off-line algorithm
that has complete a priori knowledge of the entire sequence of flow arrivals
(including the future) and their bandwidth requests. Our algorithm makes
no statistical assumptions on the flow arrival pattern or other parameters of
the arriving requests. We proved that no other algorithm performs better
in an asymptotic sense of the competitive ratio. We also showed that our
algorithm is amenable to a distributed implementation.
We presented an optimization framework for the problem of congestion
control and scheduling of elastic and inelastic traffic. The model was de-
veloped for general interference graphs, general arrivals and time-varying
channels. Using a dual function approach we presented a decomposition of
the problem into an on-line algorithm that is able to make optimal decisions
while keeping the network stable and fulfilling the inelastic flow’s per-packet
delay constraints. A key result is that, through the use of deficit counters, one
can treat the scheduling problem for elastic and inelastic flows in a common
framework.
Several problems arise as natural extensions to our work:
• Coping with Liars in Reputation Mechanisms
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In the definition of DARWIN it is assumed that nodes share the per-
ceived dropping probability with each other. This assumption is made
in order to facilitate the theoretical analysis by isolating a pair of nodes,
but in an implementation a mechanism is required to guarantee that
even if a node lies, the reputation scheme still works. To do that we
must rely on other cooperative nodes to tell the actual perceived drop-
ping probability of a node in order to minimize the impact of liars.
In [67,68] it is proved that if the connectivity of the network is at least
2f + 1, then using linear iterations it is possible for all nodes to share
some initial values to calculate an arbitrary function on them when
there are up to f malicious nodes in the network. In principle, such a
scheme can be used in our problem. The study of this in the context
of wireless networks is an interesting topic for future research.
• Scheduling Under Heterogeneous Delay Constraints
In this work we assumed that all flows have the same per-packet de-
lay. To be able to cope with heterogeneous services, it is necessary to
develop a framework that allows different users to have different dead-
lines. When scheduling, there can be scenarios where we must choose
between transmitting a packet for a flow that has a small service deficit
that is about to expire or a packet from a flow with a large deficit that
has a large time to live. The characterization of this trade-off will help
design efficient algorithms that are able to fulfill real-time requirements.
• Delay Guarantees on Wireless Multi-hop Networks
When dealing with scheduling in multi-hop networks, we must also
tackle the problem of delay partitioning, in which an end-to-end delay
is divided in per-link delays. This problem has proven hard to solve so
far because the techniques used do not take into account the feedback
from the network, but it would be interesting to investigate whether
queue-length-based scheduling algorithms can help solve the problem.
For example, when service deficits decrease in a particular link this can
potentially be taken as an indicator that the delay constraint in that
link may be decreased without having an impact on the end-to-end
service requirements.
• Guaranteeing QoS in Distributed Scheduling
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Our scheduling algorithm has been designed to achieve the capacity
region, but to do that it relies on centralized decisions. To achieve a
scheduler suitable for practical wireless ad hoc networks it is necessary
to develop a distributed mechanism. Our algorithm can be used as
a benchmark on which distributed scheduling algorithms can be stud-
ied and compared. Of great importance is investigation into whether
distributed implementations can achieve the capacity region.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In Section 2.3.3 we have already seen that if g > pe then GTFT is not a
Nash equilibrium, so for the rest of the proof we will assume g ≤ pe. It
must be noted that GTFT is a one-stage history strategy because it only
needs to take into account what happened in the previous stage. With that
in mind, and without loss of generality, let us assume that any history hn is
represented as p
(0)
i = pi for i ∈ {1, 2}. If both nodes use GTFT then using
(2.1) we have the following subgame evolution:
k p
(k)
i
0 pi
1 p−i(1− pe) + pe − g
2 pi(1− pe)
2 + (pe − g)
1∑
n=0
(1− pe)
n
3 p−i(1− pe)
3 + (pe − g)
2∑
n=0
(1− pe)
n
...
...
or equivalently for k ≥ 1:
p
(k)
i = θ
(k)
i (1− pe)
k +
(pe − g)
pe
[
1− (1− pe)
k
]
where
θ
(k)
i =
{
pi if k is even
p−i if k is odd.
Therefore from (2.2) the stage payoffs for k ≥ 1 are:
u
(k)
i = 1 +
1
2α− 1
p
(k)
i −
2α
2α− 1
p
(k)
−i .
If player i deviates at stage 1 using
p
(1)
iδ = p˜
(1)
i GTFT + δ
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for some δ > 0 and later conforms to GTFT, we have the following dropping
probabilities:
k p
(k)
iδ
0 pi
1 p−i(1− pe) + (pe − g) + δ
2 pi(1− pe)
2 + (pe − g)
1∑
n=0
(1− pe)
n
3 p−i(1− pe)
3 + (pe − g)
2∑
n=0
(1− pe)
n + δ(1− pe)
2
...
...
or equivalently:
p
(2m+1)
iδ = p−i(1− pe)
2m+1 +
(pe − g)
pe
[
1− (1− pe)
2m+1
]
+ δ(1− pe)
2m
p
(2m)
iδ = pi(1− pe)
2m +
(pe − g)
pe
[
1− (1− pe)
2m
]
.
So we have:
p
(2m+1)
iδ = p
(2m+1)
i + δ(1− pe)
2m for m ≥ 0
p
(2m)
iδ = p
(2m)
i for m ≥ 1.
Which leads to the following stage payoffs:
u
(2m+1)
iδ = u
(2m+1)
i +
1
2α− 1
δ(1− pe)
2m for m ≥ 0
u
(2m)
iδ = u
(2m)
i −
2α
2α− 1
δ(1− pe)
2m−1 for m ≥ 1.
Since the stage payoff received at stage 0 is independent of the action player
i takes at stage 1, we are only interested in finding the following discounted
average payoff:
U
(1)
iδ =
∞∑
k=1
wk−1u
(k)
iδ = U
(1)
i +
δ [1− 2αw(1− pe)]
(2α− 1) [1− w2(1− pe)2]
,
where U
(1)
i is the discounted payoff received if δ = 0. Since we assume that
α ≥ 1, it does not pay to deviate if:
1− 2αw(1− pe) < 0.
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But this is true if and only if:
w >
1
2α(1− pe)
.
Then, by the One-Stage Deviation Principle, GTFT is subgame perfect. 
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The line of reasoning is similar to that presented for Theorem 1. DARWIN is
a one-stage history strategy because it only needs to take into account what
happened in the previous stage. Hence, and without loss of generality, any
history hn can be represented as q
(0)
i = qi for i ∈ {1, 2}. If both nodes do
not deviate from DARWIN, then using (2.1) we have for k ≥ 1 the following
subgame evolution:
If qi ≥ q−i then:
p
(k)
i = 0
p
(k)
−i = p
k−1
e γ
k−1 min{1, γ(qi − q−i)}
pˆ
(k)
i = pe
pˆ
(k)
−i = pe + p
k−1
e γ
k−1(1− pe)min{1, γ(qi − q−i)}
q
(k)
i = pe
q
(k)
−i = pe − p
k
eγ
k−1 min{1, γ(qi − q−i)}
From (2.2) the stage payoffs for k ≥ 1 are:
u
(k)
i a = 1−
2α
2α− 1
[
(peγ)
k−1 min {1, γ(qi − q−i)}
]
.
If qi < q−i then:
p
(k)
i = p
k−1
e γ
k−1 min{1, γ(q−i − qi)}
p
(k)
−i = 0
pˆ
(k)
i = pe + p
k−1
e γ
k−1(1− pe)min{1, γ(q−i − qi)}
pˆ
(k)
−i = pe
q
(k)
i = pe − p
k
eγ
k−1 min{1, γ(q−i − qi)}
q
(k)
−i = pe
From (2.2) the stage payoffs for k ≥ 1 are:
u
(k)
i b = 1 +
1
2α− 1
pk−1e γ
k−1 min {1, γ(q−i − qi)} .
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If player i deviates at stage 1 using
p
(1)
iδ = p˜
(1)
i DARWIN + δ
for some δ > 0 and later conforms to DARWIN, we have the following game
evolution:
If qi ≥ q−i then:
p
(1)
i = δ
p
(k)
i = 0
p
(1)
−i = min{1, γ(qi − q−i)}
p
(k)
−i = (peγ)
k−2 min{1, γδ(1− pe) + peγp
(1)
−i }
pˆ
(1)
i = pe + δ(1− pe)
pˆ
(k)
i = pe
pˆ
(1)
−i = pe + (1− pe)p
(1)
−i
pˆ
(k)
−i = pe + (peγ)
k−2(1− pe)min{1, γδ(1− pe) + peγp
(1)
−i }
q
(1)
i = pe + δ(1− pe)
q
(k)
i = pe
q
(1)
−i = pe − pep
(1)
−i
q
(k)
−i = pe − p
k−1
e γ
k−2 min{1, γδ(1− pe) + peγp
(1)
−i }
Therefore from (2.2) the stage payoffs are:
u
(1)
iδ = u
(1)
i a +
δ
2α− 1
u
(k)
iδ = u
(k)
i a −
2α(peγ)
k−2
2α− 1
min{1− peγp
(1)
−i , γδ(1− pe)}.
Since the stage payoff received at stage 0 is independent of the action player
i takes at stage 1, we are only interested in finding the discounted average
payoff
U
(1)
iδ =
∞∑
k=1
wk−1u
(k)
iδ
= U
(1)
i a +
1
2α− 1
[
δ −
2αw
1− wpeγ
min{1− peγp
(1)
−i , γδ(1− pe)}
]
,
where U
(1)
i a is the discounted payoff received if δ = 0. It does not pay to
deviate if U
(1)
iδ < U
(1)
i a . Since we assume that α ≥ 1, we only have to check
two cases:
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1. If 1− peγp
(1)
−i < γδ(1− pe) we need the condition
δ −
2αw(1− peγp
(1)
−i )
1− wpeγ
< 0
to be true for any δ. Equivalently:
w > max
0≤δ≤1
{
δ
2α(1− peγp
(1)
−i ) + peγδ
}
.
So we get the bound:
w >
1
2α(1− peγp
(1)
−i ) + peγ
. (B.1)
2. If 1− peγp
(1)
−i ≥ γδ(1− pe) we need the following condition:
δ −
2αwγδ(1− pe)
1− wpeγ
< 0.
Thus we have the bound:
w >
1
2αγ(1− pe) + peγ
. (B.2)
For the case qi < q−i the analysis has to be more detailed. In stage 1 according
to DARWIN, player i has to drop player −i’s packets with probability
p˜
(1)
i DARWIN = min{1, γ(q−i − qi)}.
So if γ ≥ 1
q−i−qi
then player i cannot deviate at stage 1 for any value of w.
In the case that γ < 1
q−i−qi
we can only increase δ up to:
δ ≤ 1− γ(q−i − qi).
Now the rest of the analysis will consider the following two cases:
δ ≤ min
{
1− γ(q−i − qi),
peγ(q−i − qi)
1− pe
}
(B.3)
peγ(q−i − qi)
1− pe
< δ ≤ 1− γ(q−i − qi) (B.4)
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For the case when (B.3) is true we have the following evolution of the game:
p
(1)
i = γ(q−i − qi) + δ
p
(k)
i = p
k−1
e γ
k(q−i − qi)− δp
k−2
e γ
k−1(1− pe)
p
(1)
−i = 0
p
(k)
−i = 0
pˆ
(1)
i = pe + γ(q−i − qi)(1− pe) + δ(1− pe)
pˆ
(k)
i = pe + p
k−1
e γ
k(q−i − qi)(1− pe)− δp
k−2
e γ
k−1(1− pe)
2
pˆ
(1)
−i = pe
pˆ
(k)
−i = pe
q
(1)
i = pe − peγ(q−i − qi) + δ(1− pe)
q
(k)
i = pe − p
k
eγ
k(q−i − qi) + δp
k−1
e γ
k−1(1− pe)
q
(1)
−i = pe
q
(k)
−i = pe
In this case, and from (2.2), the stage payoffs are:
u
(1)
iδ = u
(1)
i b +
δ
2α− 1
u
(k)
iδ = u
(k)
i b −
δpk−2e γ
k−1(1− pe)
2α− 1
.
And the discounted average payoff starting from stage 1 is:
U
(1)
iδ =
∞∑
k=1
wk−1u
(k)
iδ = U
(1)
i b +
δ
2α− 1
[
1−
wγ(1− pe)
1− wpeγ
]
.
Since α ≥ 1 it does not pay to deviate if:
1−
wγ(1− pe)
1− wpeγ
< 0.
Which leads to the following bound on w:
w >
1
γ
. (B.5)
For the case when (B.4) is true we have the following game evolution:
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p
(1)
i = γ(q−i − qi) + δ
p
(k)
i = 0
p
(1)
−i = 0
p
(k)
−i = p
k−2
e γ
k−2 min{1, γδ(1− pe)− peγ
2(q−i − qi)}
pˆ
(1)
i = pe + γ(q−i − qi)(1− pe) + δ(1− pe)
pˆ
(k)
i = pe
pˆ
(1)
−i = pe
pˆ
(k)
−i = pe + (1− pe)p
(k)
−i
q
(1)
i = pe − peγ(q−i − qi) + δ(1− pe)
q
(k)
i = pe
q
(1)
−i = pe
q
(k)
−i = pe − pep
(k)
−i
From (2.2), the respective stage payoffs are:
u
(1)
iδ = u
(1)
i b +
δ
2α− 1
u
(k)
iδ = u
(k)
i b−
(peγ)
k−2
2α− 1
[
peγ
2(q−i − qi) + 2αmin{1, γδ(1− pe)− peγ
2(q−i − qi)}
]
.
The discounted average payoff starting from stage 1 is:
U
(1)
iδ =
∞∑
k=1
wk−1u
(k)
iδ
= U
(1)
i b +
1
2α− 1
{
δ −
w [peγ
2Q+ 2αmin{1, γδ(1− pe)− peγ
2Q}]
1− wpeγ
}
,
where Q = q−i− qi and U
(1)
i b is the discounted payoff received if player i does
not deviate. It does not pay to deviate if U
(1)
iδ < U
(1)
i b . Since we assume
α ≥ 1, we have:
1. If γδ(1− pe)− peγ
2(q−i − qi) > 1, we need the condition
δ −
w[2α+ peγ
2(q−i − qi)]
1− wpeγ
< 0
to be true for any δ. Equivalently:
w > max
δ
{
δ
2α+ peγ2(q−i − qi) + peγδ
}
.
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Since δ is bounded by (B.4) we get:
w >
1− γ(q−i − qi)
2α+ peγ2(q−i − qi) + peγ[1− γ(q−i − qi)]
.
Simplifying:
w >
1− γ(q−i − qi)
2α+ peγ
. (B.6)
2. If γδ(1− pe)− peγ
2(q−i − qi) ≤ 1, we need the following condition:
δ −
w [peγ
2Q+ 2αγδ(1− pe)− 2αpeγ
2Q]
1− wpeγ
< 0,
where Q was defined above. Thus we have the bound:
w > max
δ
{
δ
δ [2αγ(1− pe) + peγ]− (2α− 1)peγ2Q
}
.
Since δ is bounded by (B.4) we get:
w >
1
γ
. (B.7)
So for a given history hn we have found five bounds that w has to fulfill
in order for DARWIN to be a Nash equilibrium in a given subgame. We
first start noting that (B.5) and (B.7) are identical, so we really have four
bounds, two of which are dependent on hn. In order to find the conditions
under which DARWIN is subgame perfect, we need to find bounds that are
history independent. In the case of (B.1) the bound is maximized by:
w >
1
2α(1− peγ) + peγ
. (B.8)
Similarly, (B.6) is maximized by:
w >
1
2α+ peγ
. (B.9)
Comparing (B.2), (B.8) and (B.9) it is easy to check that (B.8) is the strictest
bound since we assumed γ > 1. In summary, we have the following bound
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on w for DARWIN:
w > max
{
1
γ
,
1
2α(1− peγ) + peγ
}
.
Thus if the bound holds true, by the One-Stage Deviation Principle, DAR-
WIN is subgame perfect. 
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We prove the result by contradiction. Let fj ∈ F be the first admitted flow
request that violates capacity constraints when admitted. Thus, there is a
node n ∈ N and time t ∈ [ tSj , t
F
j ) such that
λn(t) +Qn(Pj)rj(t) > 1
which necessarily means that Qn(Pj) ≥ 1 by the definition of Qn(Pj).
Therefore:
cn(t)
(3.9)
= µλn(t) − 1
> µ1−Qn(Pj)rj(t) − 1
(3.4)
≥ µ1−Qrj(t) − 1
(3.6)
≥ µ1−
1
log µ − 1
=
µ
2
− 1
(3.7)
= QTTF.
So we have
cn(t) > QTTF,
which implies
Qn(Pj)rj(t)cn(t) > Qn(Pj)rj(t)QTTF
≥ rj(t)QTTF
(3.5)
≥ ρj.
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So flow fj should not have been admitted in the first place according to
the ACR algorithm. 
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The proof will proceed by induction over k. The case k = 0 is trivially true
since both sides of the inequality are zero. If a request is rejected, then
neither side of the inequality changes, so we only need to prove that for any
accepted flow fi we have:
2ρi log µ ≥
∑
t
∑
n
[cn(t, i+ 1)− cn(t, i)] .
Consider any node n ∈ N . Using the fact that
2x − 1 ≤ x for x ∈ [0, 1] (D.1)
we have the following:
cn(t, i+ 1)− cn(t, i)
(3.13)
= µλn(t,i+1) − µλn(t,i)
(3.12)
= µλn(t,i)
[
µQn(Pi)ri(t) − 1
]
= µλn(t,i)
[
2Qn(Pi)ri(t) log µ − 1
]
(3.6)(D.1)
≤ µλn(t,i)Qn(Pi)ri(t) log µ
(3.13)
= [cn(t, i) + 1]Qn(Pi)ri(t) log µ
= log µ [Qn(Pi)ri(t)cn(t, i) +Qn(Pi)ri(t)] .
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Therefore, we have
∑
t
∑
n
[cn(t, i+ 1)− cn(t, i)]
≤ log µ
[∑
t
∑
n
Qn(Pi)ri(t)cn(t, i) +
∑
t
∑
n
Qn(Pi)ri(t)
]
(3.10)
≤ log µ
[
ρi +
∑
n
Qn(Pi)
∑
t
ri(t)
]
(3.3)
= log µ
[
ρi +QT (Pi)
∑
t
ri(t)
]
(3.5)
≤ 2ρi log µ.

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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Since j ∈ AO\A was rejected by the ACR algorithm it must be the case that
(3.10) was false. Due to the monotonicity of cn(t, j) on i we have
ρj <
∑
n
∑
t
Qn(Pj)rj(t)cn(t, j)
≤
∑
n
∑
t
Qn(Pj)rj(t)cn(t,m).
Summing up over j ∈ AO\A, and taking into account that the off-line
algorithm must enforce capacity constraints, we have:
∑
j∈AO\A
ρj ≤
∑
j∈AO\A
∑
n
∑
t
Qn(Pj)rj(t)cn(t,m)
=
∑
n
∑
t

cn(t,m) ∑
j∈AO\A
Qn(Pj)rj(t)


(3.12)(3.8)
≤
∑
n
∑
t
cn(t,m).

90
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Using the monotonicity of cn(t, i) on i, we have that the profit accrued by
the optimal off-line algorithm can be bounded as follows:
∑
j∈AOFF
ρj ≤
∑
j∈AO\A
ρj +
∑
j∈AACR
ρj
Lemma 6
≤
∑
n
∑
t
cn(t,m) +
∑
j∈AACR
ρj
≤
∑
n
∑
t
cn(t, k + 1) +
∑
j∈AACR
ρj
Lemma 5
≤ 2 log µ
∑
j∈AACR
ρj +
∑
j∈AACR
ρj
= (2 log µ+ 1)
∑
j∈AACR
ρj.
Therefore: ∑
j∈AOFF
ρj = O(log(QTTF ))
∑
j∈AACR
ρj.
And using Lemma 4 the proof is done. 
91
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
The idea behind the proof is simple. We need to construct a sequence of
requests that have unit holding time, and each offers the same profit, but
its path length is exponentially decreasing; thus, future requests generate
greater profit per unit of resource consumed. Since no on-line algorithm
has knowledge about future requests, we generate requests until the ratio
between the profits of the off-line and on-line algorithms is maximized.
Assume that all requests appear at the beginning and request some fixed
rate r that is small enough according to (3.6). DefineW (QT ) to be a wireless
network of QT/2 nodes arranged in a ring such that any node can only
communicate and interfere with its nearest neighbors. Number the nodes
from 0 to QT/2− 1 and for convenience let QT be a power of 2.
Consider the following sequence of requests of unit duration consisting of
log(QT/2) phases, where phase p (1 ≤ p ≤ log(QT/2)) consists of 2
p groups
of requests.
A request in phase p, group g (0 ≤ g ≤ 2p − 1), has as source node
g(QT/2)2
−p and destination node [(g + 1)(QT/2)2
−p] mod (QT/2). Each
group consists of 1/4r identical requests, requesting rate r and offering the
same profit, e.g., rQT .
Let up be the profit the on-line algorithm receives due to requests in phase
p. From the definitions of Qn(Pj) and QT (Pj), and using (3.12) we know that
in order to achieve a unit of profit we need to use 2−(p−1) units of capacity,
which implies that at phase p we have used up2
−(p−1) units of capacity. Since
total network capacity is QT/2 we have:
log(QT /2)∑
p=1
up
2p−1
≤
QT
2
. (G.1)
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Define Sp =
1
2p
p∑
i=1
ui. Thus we have:
log(QT /2)∑
p=1
Sp =
log(QT /2)∑
p=1
p∑
i=1
ui
2p
≤
log(QT /2)∑
p=1
up
2p−1
(G.1)
≤
QT
2
.
Hence, for any on-line algorithm there exists k such that
Sk ≤
QT/2
log(QT/2)
.
Now consider a new set of requests consisting only of the first k phases. The
profit accrued by the on-line algorithm is then
k∑
p=1
up = 2
kSk ≤ 2
k QT/2
log(QT/2)
.
The off-line algorithm can reject all the requests but those in phase k,
achieving a profit of 2kQT/4. So the competitive ratio for this topology
will be greater than or equal to 1
2
log(QT/2). Thus, the competitive ratio is
Ω(logQT ) for any on-line algorithm. 
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APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
To proceed to prove this lemma we use the same ideas as in Lemma 7, by
considering a wireless network consisting of two nodes that are within recep-
tion range of each other and constructing a sequence of requests where each
request offers the same profit and has an exponentially decreasing holding
time.
Assume that all requests appear at the beginning and request some fixed
rate r that is small enough according to (3.6). Consider a wireless network
comprised of two nodes that are within reception range of each other, and
a sequence of requests consisting of log T phases, where T is a power of 2
and phase p (1 ≤ p ≤ log T ) consists of 2p groups of requests. Each group
consists of 1/r requests, where each request requires a rate r and provides
the same profit, e.g. QT rT . In this case we have QT = 2.
A request in phase p, group g (0 ≤ g ≤ 2p−1), has as starting time gT2−p
and finishing time (g + 1)T2−p.
Let up be the profit the on-line algorithm receives due to requests in phase
p. From the definitions of Qn(Pj) and using (3.12) we know that in order to
achieve a unit of profit we need to send 2−(p+1) bits, which implies that at
phase p we have sent up2
−(p+1) bits. Since total available bits is T we have:
log T∑
p=1
up
2p+1
≤ T. (H.1)
Define Sp =
1
2p+2
p∑
i=1
ui. Thus, we have:
log T∑
p=1
Sp =
log T∑
p=1
p∑
i=1
ui
2p+2
≤
log T∑
p=1
up
2p+1
(H.1)
≤ T.
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Hence, for any on-line algorithm there exists k such that
Sk ≤
T
log T
.
Now consider a new set of requests consisting only of the first k phases. The
profit accrued by the on-line algorithm is then
k∑
p=1
up = 2
k+2Sk ≤
2k+2T
log T
.
The off-line algorithm can reject all the requests but those in phase k,
achieving a profit of 2k+1T . So the competitive ratio for this topology will
be greater than or equal to 1
2
log T = Ω(log T ). 
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 9
Borrowing from the ideas in Lemma 7, to prove this lemma, consider a wire-
less network consisting of two nodes that are within reception range of each
other and construct a sequence of requests of unit holding times that have
an exponentially increasing profit.
Assume that all requests appear at the beginning and request some fixed
rate r that is small enough according to (3.6). Consider a wireless network
comprised of two nodes that are within reception range of each other, and a
sequence of requests consisting of logF phases, where F is a power of 2 and
phase p (1 ≤ p ≤ logF ) consists of 1/r requests of unit duration, where each
request requires a rate r. In this case we have QT = 2.
A request in phase p provides a profit of r2p+1. It is easy to check that
such a profit complies with (3.5).
Let up be the profit the on-line algorithm receives due to requests in phase
p. From the definitions of Qn(Pj) and QT (Pj), and using (3.12) we know
that in order to achieve a unit of profit we need to use 2−p units of capacity,
which implies that at phase p we have used up2
−p units of capacity. Since
total network capacity is 2 we have:
logF∑
p=1
up
2p
≤ 2. (I.1)
Define Sp =
1
2p+1
p∑
i=1
ui. Thus, we have:
logF∑
p=1
Sp =
logF∑
p=1
p∑
i=1
ui
2p+1
≤
logF∑
p=1
up
2p
(I.1)
≤ 2.
Hence, for any on-line algorithm there exists k such that
Sk ≤
2
logF
.
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Now consider a new set of requests consisting only of the first k phases. The
profit accrued by the on-line algorithm is then
k∑
p=1
up = 2
k+1Sk ≤
2k+2
logF
.
The off-line algorithm can reject all the requests but those in phase k,
achieving a profit of 2k+1. So the competitive ratio for this topology will be
greater than or equal to 1
2
logF = Ω(logF ). 
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APPENDIX J
PROOF OF LEMMA 10
Similar to Lemma 7, the idea is to construct a sequence of requests such that
future requests generate greater profit per unit of resource used. Since no
on-line algorithm has knowledge about future requests, we generate requests
until we maximize the competitive ratio.
Define W(QT ) to be a wireless network of QT/4+3 nodes uniformly spaced
on a line segment such that any node can only communicate with its nearest
neighbors, and assume that QT is such that Q
1
4k
T is an even number greater
than or equal to 4.
Number the nodes from 0 to QT/4+2 and consider the following sequence
of requests of unit duration and rate 1/4k consisting of k + 1 phases, where
each request offers the same profit, e.g., QT/4k.
In phase 0 there is a request from node 1 to node QT/4 + 1. The first
request must be accepted because it can be the only one. Using the definition
of QT (Pj) and Qn(Pj) it is easy to check that QT (P0) = QT . This means
that before phase 1 the load of any node in the range 1 + Q
1− 1
4k
T /4 to 1 +
(Q
1
4k
T − 1)Q
1− 1
4k
T /4 is λn = 1/k, with the profit accrued being QT/4k.
We claim that for phases 1 through k the following statement holds true:
Either the lower bound has already been proved, or before phase j the load
of any node in the range ij + Q
1− j
4k
T /4 to ij + (Q
1
4k
T − 1)Q
1− j
4k
T /4 for some
ij is λn = j/k and the total profit accrued so far is jQT/4k by the on-line
algorithm.
To prove the claim we use induction. For phase 1 let i1 = 1. We now
assume that the statement is true for phase j and some ij and prove it for
j + 1 and some ij+1.
We now make k requests with source node ij +mQ
1− j
4k
T /4 and destination
ij + (m + 1)Q
1− j
4k
T /4 for 1 ≤ m ≤ Q
1
4k
T − 2. If all the requests are rejected
by the on-line algorithm then the lower bound has been proved since the
off-line algorithm can reject all requests but those in phase j and achieve a
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profit of
(
Q
1
4k
T − 2
)
QT/4 while the on-line algorithm only accrued a profit
of jQT/4k ≤ QT/4.
However, if there is an accepted request we stop phase j after such a
request. That request is from node ij +mQ
1− j
4k
T /4 to ij + (m + 1)Q
1− j
4k
T /4
for some 1 ≤ m ≤ Q
1
4k
T − 2. Define ij+1 = ij +mQ
1− j
4k
T /4. We have that the
total profit accrued by the on-line algorithm before phase j + 1 is jQT/4k+
QT/4k = (j + 1)QT/4k and the load of the nodes from ij+1 + Q
1− j+1
4k
T /4 to
ij+1 +(Q
1
4k
T − 1)Q
1− j+1
4k
T /4 is 4(j+1)/4k = (j+1)/k, which proves the claim.
The statement means that at the start of phase k either the lower bound
has already been proved or the load of any node in the range ik + Q
3
4
T/4 to
ik+(Q
1
4k
T −1)Q
3
4
T/4 is λn = 1. Thus, the on-line algorithm has to reject all the
k requests from node ik +mQ
3
4
T/4 to ik + (m+1)Q
3
4
T/4 for 1 ≤ m ≤ Q
1
4k
T − 2,
while the off-line algorithm can reject all requests but those at phase k, and
achieve a total profit of QT
(
Q
1
4k
T − 2
)
/4. The total profit of the on-line
algorithm is bounded by QT/4, which proves the lower bound. 
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APPENDIX K
PROOF OF LEMMA 11
The proof follows the same line of reasoning as in Lemma 10, where we
consider a wireless network consisting of two nodes that are within reception
range of each other and construct a sequence of requests, each of which offers
the same profit and has an exponentially decreasing holding time.
Consider a wireless network comprised of two nodes that are within recep-
tion range of each other and assume that T is such that T
1
k is an integer
greater than or equal to 2.
Furthermore, consider the following sequence of requests consisting of k+1
phases, where each request asks for a rate of 1
k
and offers the same profit,
e.g., TQT/k. In this case we have QT = 2.
In phase 0 there is a request with starting time 0 and finishing time T . The
first request must be accepted because it can be the only one. This means
that before phase 1 the load of both nodes from time 0 to T is 1/k, with an
accrued profit of 2T/k.
We claim that for phases 1 through k the following statement holds true:
Either the lower bound has already been proved, or before phase j the load
of both nodes from time tj to tj + T
1− j−1
k is j/k, with an accrued profit of
2Tj/k for the on-line algorithm.
To prove the claim we use induction. For phase 1 let tj = 0. We now
assume that the statement is true for phase j and some tj and prove it for
j + 1 and some tj+1.
We now make k requests from time tj +mT
1− j
k to tj + (m + 1)T
1− j
k for
0 ≤ m ≤ T
1
k −1. If all the requests are rejected by the on-line algorithm then
the lower bound has been proved since the off-line algorithm can reject all
requests but those in phase j and achieve a profit of 2T 1+
1
k while the on-line
algorithm only accrued a profit of 2Tj/k ≤ 2T .
However, if there is an accepted request we stop phase j after such a
request. That request is from time tj + mT
1− j
k to tj + (m + 1)T
1− j
k for
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some 0 ≤ m ≤ T
1
k − 1. Define tj+1 = tj +mT
1− j
k . We have that the total
profit accrued by the on-line algorithm before phase j+1 is 2Tj/k+2T/k =
2T (j + 1)/k and the load of both nodes from time tj+1 to tj+1 + T
1− j
k is
(j + 1)/k, which proves the claim.
The statement means that at the start of phase k either the lower bound
has already been proved or the load of both nodes between time tk and tk+T
1
k
is 1. Thus, the on-line algorithm has to reject all the k requests from tk +m
to tk +m+ 1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ T
1
k − 1, while the off-line algorithm can reject all
requests but the ones at phase k, achieving a profit of 2T 1+
1
k . The profit of
the on-line algorithm is bounded by 2T , which proves the lower bound. 
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APPENDIX L
PROOF OF LEMMA 12
To prove this lemma we proceed along the same lines as in Lemma 10, by
considering a pair of nodes that are within reception range of each other
and constructing a sequence of requests of unit duration where the profit
increases exponentially.
Consider a wireless network comprised of two nodes that are within re-
ception range of each other, and the following sequence of requests of unit
duration consisting of k+1 phases, where each request asks for a rate of 1/k.
In this case we have QT = 2. A request in phase j provides a profit of 2F
j
k /k
for 0 ≤ j ≤ k.
In phase 0 there is a request, which must be accepted because it can be
the only one. This means that before phase 1 the load of both nodes is 1/k
and the profit is 2/k.
We claim that for phases 1 through k the following statement holds true:
Either the lower bound has already been proved, or before phase j the load
of both nodes is j/k, with an accrued profit of
j−1∑
i=0
2F
i
k
k
for the on-line algorithm.
To prove the claim we use induction. For phase 1 the claim is clearly true,
so we assume that the statement is true for phase j and prove it for phase
j + 1.
We now make k requests. If all the requests are rejected by the on-line
algorithm, then the lower bound has been proved since the off-line algorithm
can reject all requests but those in phase j and achieve a profit of 2F
j
k while
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the on-line algorithm only accrued a profit of
j−1∑
i=0
2F
i
k
k
≤
2jF
j−1
k
k
≤ 2F
j−1
k .
However, if there is an accepted request we stop phase j after such a
request. We have that the total profit accrued by the on-line algorithm
before phase j + 1 is
j∑
i=0
2F
i
k
k
and the load of both nodes is (j + 1)/k, which proves the claim.
The statement means that at the start of phase k either the lower bound
has already been proved or the load of both nodes is 1. Thus, the on-line
algorithm has to reject all the k requests in the last phase, while the off-line
algorithm can reject all requests but those at phase k, achieving a profit of
2F . The profit of the on-line algorithm is bounded by 2F 1−
1
k , which proves
the lower bound. 
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APPENDIX M
PROOF OF LEMMA 13
To prove Lemma 13, we start by first proving two auxiliary lemmas and then
stating a fact.
Lemma 18. Given that at frame k we have the event d(k) = d and q(k) = q,
then
E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
{[dl + a˜il(k)− I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
+}2
]
−
∑
l∈L
d2l
2
≤B6 +
∑
l∈L
dlλl(1− pl)− E
[∑
l∈L
(
1
ǫ
wl + dl
)
I∗il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)
−
∑
l∈L
1
ǫ
wlI
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)
]
for some non-negative constant B6, and where I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q) is given by
the solution to (4.6). ⋄
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Proof.
E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
{[dl + a˜il(k)− I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
+}2
]
−
∑
l∈L
d2l
2
≤E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
[dl + a˜il(k)− I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
2
]
−
∑
l∈L
d2l
2
=E
[∑
l∈L
dl[a˜il(k)− I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
+
1
2
∑
l∈L
[a˜il(k)− I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
2
]
≤E
[∑
l∈L
dla˜il(k)− dlI
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q) +
1
2
∑
l∈L
a˜2il(k) + a
2
il(k)
]
(M.1)
≤B6 +
∑
l∈L
dlλl(1− pl)
− E
[∑
l∈L
(
1
ǫ
wl + dl
)
I∗il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)−
∑
l∈L
1
ǫ
wlI
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)
]
where (M.1) follows from the definition of I∗il(ai(k), c(k), d, q) and
B6 =
1
2
∑
l∈L
(λ2l + σ
2
il)[1 + (1− pl)
2] + λlpl(1− pl).
Lemma 19. Given that at frame k we have the event d(k) = d and q(k) = q,
then
E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
{[ql + a˜el(k)− I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
+}2
]
−
∑
l∈L
q2l
2
≤B7 −
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
[Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))]−
∑
l∈L
ql {E [I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]− x
∗
l }
for some constant B7 > 0, where x
∗ and x˜∗(k) are the solutions to (4.3) and
(4.5) respectively. ⋄
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Proof.
E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
{[ql + a˜el(k)− I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
+}2
]
−
∑
l∈L
q2l
2
≤E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
[ql + a˜el(k)− I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
2
]
−
∑
l∈L
q2l
2
=E
[∑
l∈L
ql[a˜el(k)− I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
+
1
2
∑
l∈L
[a˜el(k)− I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
2
]
≤E
[∑
l∈L
qla˜el(k)− qlI
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q) +
1
2
∑
l∈L
(a˜2el(k) + c
2
l T
2)
]
(M.2)
≤B7 +
∑
l∈L
−[
1
ǫ
Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))− qlx˜
∗
l (k)] +
∑
l∈L
1
ǫ
Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))
−
∑
l∈L
qlE [I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
≤B7 +
∑
l∈L
−[
1
ǫ
Ul(x
∗
l )− qlx
∗
l ] +
∑
l∈L
1
ǫ
Ul(x˜
∗
l (k)) (M.3)
−
∑
l∈L
qlE [I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
=B7 −
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
[Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))]−
∑
l∈L
ql {E [I
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]− x
∗
l }
where (M.2) follows from the definition of I∗el(ai(k), c(k), d, q),
B7 =
1
2
∑
l∈L
X2max + σ
2
e + (c¯
2
l + σ
2
cl)T
2,
and (M.3) follows from the fact that x˜∗(k) is the optimal point of (4.5).
Fact 2. The optimization in (4.6) can be performed over S(ai(k), c(k))CH,
the convex hull of S(ai(k), c(k)); that is,
max
s∈S(ai(k),c(k))
∑
l∈L
{[
1
ǫ
wl + dl(k)
] T∑
t=1
sil,t + ql(k)
T∑
t=1
sel,t
}
=
max
s∈S(ai(k),c(k))CH
∑
l∈L
{[
1
ǫ
wl + dl(k)
] T∑
t=1
sil,t + ql(k)
T∑
t=1
sel,t
}
.
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The reason for this comes from the fact that the objective function is linear
and therefore there must be an optimal point s∗(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))) ∈
S(ai(k), c(k)). ⋄
Proof of Lemma 13. For the purpose of this proof, we define the capacity
region for fixed arrival and channel states ai and c as follows:
C(ai, c)
def
=
{
(µ¯il, µ¯el)l∈L : there exists s¯ ∈ S(ai, c)CH,
µ¯il ≤
∑T
t=1 s¯il,t and µ¯el ≤
∑T
t=1 s¯el,t
}
.
Then, the overall capacity of the network is defined as C
def
=
{
(µil, µel)l∈L : there exists (µ¯il(ai, c), µ¯el(ai, c))l∈L ∈ C(ai, c) for all ai, c
and µil = E[µ¯il(ai, c)], µel = E[µ¯el(ai, c)] for all l ∈ L
}
.
From Lemmas 18 and 19 we have:
E [V (d(k + 1), q(k + 1))|d(k) = d, q(k) = q]− V (d, q)
≤B1 +
∑
l∈L
dlλl(1− pl) +
∑
l∈L
qlx
∗
l −
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
[Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))]
− E
[∑
l∈L
(
1
ǫ
wl + dl
)
I∗il(ai(k), c(k), d, q) +
∑
l∈L
qlI
∗
el(ai(k), c(k), d, q)
]
+
∑
l∈L
1
ǫ
wlE [I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
≤B1 +
∑
l∈L
dlλl(1− pl) +
∑
l∈L
qlx
∗
l −
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
[Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))] (M.4)
− E
[∑
l∈L
(
1
ǫ
wl + dl
)
µ¯il(ai(k), c(k)) +
∑
l∈L
qlµ¯el(ai(k), c(k))
]
+
∑
l∈L
1
ǫ
wlE [I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
=B1 −
∑
l∈L
dl[µil − λl(1− pl)]−
∑
l∈L
ql(µel − x
∗
l ) (M.5)
−
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
[Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))]−
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
wlµil − wlE [I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
whereB1 = B6+B7, (M.4) follows for any (µ¯il(ai(k), c(k)), µ¯el(ai(k), c(k)))l∈L ∈
C(ai(k), c(k)) as was explained in Fact 2, and (M.5) holds for any (µil, µel)l∈L ∈
C. It should be clear that (µ∗il, µ
∗
el)l∈L ∈ C, where (µ
∗
il, µ
∗
el)l∈L is the solution
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to (4.3). Thus we have the following:
E [V (d(k + 1), q(k + 1))|d(k) = d, q(k) = q]− V (d, q)
≤B1 −B2
∑
l∈L
dl −B3
∑
l∈L
ql −
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
[Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))]
−
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
wlµ
∗
il − wlE [I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
where
B2 = min
l∈L
{µ∗il − λl(1− pl)}
and
B3 = min
l∈L
{µ∗el − x
∗
l } .
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From Lemma 13 we know that
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k)) +
1
ǫ
∑
l∈L
wlµ
∗
il − wlE [I
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d, q)]
≤B1 −B2
∑
l∈L
dl −B3
∑
l∈L
ql + V (d, q)
− E [V (d(k + 1), q(k + 1))|d(k) = d, q(k) = q]
≤B1 + V (d, q)− E [V (d(k + 1), q(k + 1))|d(k) = d, q(k) = q]
since B2
∑
l∈L dl +B3
∑
l∈L ql ≥ 0 for all d. Taking expectations:
1
ǫ
E
[∑
l∈L
Ul(x
∗
l )− Ul(x˜
∗
l (k)) +
∑
l∈L
wlµ
∗
il − wlI
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))
]
≤B1 − E [V (d(k + 1), q(k + 1))] + E [V (d(k), q(k))] .
Adding the terms for k = {1, . . . , K} and dividing by K we get:
1
ǫ
E
[∑
l∈L
Ul(x
∗
l ) + wlµ
∗
il
−
∑
l∈L
1
K
K∑
k=1
Ul(x˜
∗
l (k)) + wlI
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))
]
≤ B1 −
E [V (d(K + 1), q(K + 1))]
K
+
E [V (d(1), q(1))]
K
≤ B1 +
E [V (d(1), q(1))]
K
(N.1)
where (N.1) follows from the fact that the Lyapunov function V is non-
negative.
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Assuming E [V (d(1), q(1))] <∞ we get the following limit expression:
lim sup
K→∞
E
[∑
l∈L
Ul(x
∗
l ) + wlµ
∗
il −
∑
l∈L
1
K
K∑
k=1
Ul(x˜
∗
l (k))
−
∑
l∈L
1
K
K∑
k=1
wlI
∗
il(ai(k), c(k), d(k), q(k))
]
≤ Bǫ
where B = B1. 
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APPENDIX O
PROOF OF LEMMA 14
To prove Lemma 14, we start by first stating a fact.
Fact 3. The following optimization problems have the same optimal value:
max
s∈S
∑
l∈L
dl [1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ]
and
max
τ,µ,Pr(s)
∑
l∈L
dlµl
subject to
τl,s =
T∑
t=1
sl,t for all l ∈ L and s ∈ S
µl ≤
∑
s∈S
[1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ]Pr(s) for all l ∈ L
Pr(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S∑
s∈S
Pr(s) ≤ 1.
⋄
The reason for the equivalence of these optimization problems follows the
same logic used in Section 4.4.2 for the case δ = d.
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Proof of Lemma 14.
E [V (d(k + 1))|d(k) = d]− V (d)
=E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
{[dl + a˜l(k)− I
∗
l (c(k), d)]
+}2
]
−
∑
l∈L
d2l
2
≤E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
[dl + a˜l(k)− I
∗
l (c(k), d)]
2
]
−
∑
l∈L
d2l
2
=E
[∑
l∈L
dl[a˜l(k)− I
∗
l (c(k), d)] +
1
2
∑
l∈L
[a˜l(k)− I
∗
l (c(k), d)]
2
]
≤E
[∑
l∈L
dl [a˜l(k)− I
∗
l (c(k), d)] +
1
2
∑
l∈L
[a˜2l (k) + 1]
]
(O.1)
=
∑
l∈L
dl(1− pl)−
∑
l∈L
dl
[
1− (1− c¯l)
τ∗l,s(k)
]
+
1
2
∑
l∈L
[
(1− pl)
2 + pl(1− pl) + 1
]
≤B1 +
∑
l∈L
dl(1− pl)−
∑
l∈L
dlµ
∗
l (O.2)
≤B1 −B2
∑
l∈L
dl
where (O.1) follows from the definition of I∗l (c(k), d), τ
∗
l,s(k) is given by the
solution to (4.12), µ∗ is a solution to (4.10), (O.2) follows from Fact 3 and
B1 =
1
2
∑
l∈L
(2− pl)
B2 = min
l∈L
{µ∗l − (1− pl)} .
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Assume there is some policy
s∗(d) ∈ argmax
s∈S(d)
∑
l∈L
dl [1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s ]
such that (4.13) is false.
Define the schedule s˜ such that s˜l,t = s
∗
l,t(d) for t ∈ {2, . . . , T} and
l ∈ L and s˜l,1 is chosen such that (4.13) holds true. Additionally, let
l˜ = argmaxl∈L s˜l,1 and l
∗ = argmaxl∈L s
∗
l,1(d). In this case we have:
∑
l∈L
dl [1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s˜ ]−
∑
l∈L
dl [1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s∗ ]
=dl˜ [1− (1− c¯l˜)] + dl∗
[
1− (1− c¯l∗)
τl∗,s∗−1
]
− dl∗ [1− (1− c¯l∗)
τl∗,s∗ ]
=dl˜c¯l˜ + dl∗
[
(1− c¯l∗)
τl∗,s∗ − (1− c¯l∗)
τl∗,s∗−1
]
=dl˜c¯l˜ − dl∗ c¯l∗(1− c¯l∗)
τl∗,s∗−1
≥dl˜c¯l˜ − dl∗ c¯l∗
>0.
So we have found a scheduling policy that improves on s∗(d), contradicting
the optimality assumption. 
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The proof is done by induction: we will show that at every time slot the best
strategy is to schedule the link with the largest weight dlc¯l among the links
that have a packet that remains to be transmitted.
From Lemma 15 we know that at time slot 1 the greedy strategy is the
best strategy. We now assume that up to time slot j the best strategy is to
use the greedy strategy, and prove that at time slot j + 1 the best strategy
is to use again the greedy strategy.
Denote by Lr(j +1) the set of links that have a packet that remains to be
transmitted at time slot j +1. We note that the history up to time j can be
completely described by d and Lr(j + 1). Therefore, in time slot j + 1 we
need to solve the following optimization problem:
(s˜∗l,t(d))
t∈{j+1,...,T}
l∈L ∈ argmax
s∈S(d)
∑
l∈Lr(j+1)
dl
[
1− (1− c¯l)
τl,s(j+1)
]
,
where
τl,s(j + 1) =
T∑
t=j+1
sl,t for all l ∈ L and s ∈ S.
But this optimization is equivalent to the problem we studied in Lemma
15 for the case that we have T − j time slots in a frame and L = Lr(j + 1),
so the best strategy in time slot j + 1 is to use the greedy strategy. 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 17
Assuming that the channel state at frame k is given by c(k), define
Igl (c(k), d)
def
=
T∑
t=1
cl,t(k)s
g
l,t(c(k), d)
to be the service given to link l by the greedy strategy. In this case we have
E [V (d(k + 1))|d(k) = d]− V (d)
=E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
{[dl + a˜l(k)− I
g
l (c(k), d)]
+}2
]
−
∑
l∈L
d2l
2
≤E
[
1
2
∑
l∈L
[dl + a˜l(k)− I
g
l (c(k), d)]
2
]
−
∑
l∈L
d2l
2
=E
[∑
l∈L
dl[a˜l(k)− I
g
l (c(k), d)] +
1
2
∑
l∈L
[a˜l(k)− I
g
l (c(k), d)]
2
]
≤E
[∑
l∈L
dl [a˜l(k)− I
g
l (c(k), d)] +
1
2
∑
l∈L
[a˜2l (k) + 1]
]
(R.1)
=
∑
l∈L
dl(1− pl) +
1
2
∑
l∈L
[
(1− pl)
2 + pl(1− pl) + 1
]
−
∑
l∈L
dlE
[
T∑
t=1
cl,t(k)s
g
l,t(c(k), d)
∣∣∣∣∣d(k) = d
]
≤
∑
l∈L
dl(1− pl)−
∑
l∈L
dl
[
1− (1− c¯l)
τ∗
l,s
(k)
]
(R.2)
+
1
2
∑
l∈L
[
(1− pl)
2 + pl(1− pl) + 1
]
≤B1 −B2
∑
l∈L
dl (R.3)
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where (R.1) is a consequence of the definition of Igl (c(k), d), (R.2) follows
from Lemma 16, and (R.3) comes from the proof of Lemma 14. 
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